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Abstract
During May and June 2007, the occupied Palestinian territories witnessed serious domestic  
fighting as a result of the power struggle between the two leading political parties, Fata  and!  
am!s. The fighting left hundreds of Palestinians dead and ultimately led to the split between"  
a Fata -controlled West Bank and a am!s-controlled Gaza Strip that still remains at the time! "  
of writing. 
This thesis examines how three significant events in this power struggle were represented in  
the news reports of two Palestinian newspaper with different political affiliations, namely the  
Fata -affiliated ! al- ay!t al-jad"da!  and the am!s-affiliated " Filas "n" . Through combining 
social and textual analysis, based on the theoretical and methodological framework of critical  
discourse analysis, I examine how the apparently neutral news reports still carry ideological  
meaning. My findings show that different choices in linguistic expression such as transitivity  
and lexicon have a major impact on how the two newspapers represent different aspects of the  
events, and by referring to the wider political and sociocultural context surrounding the  
reports, I find that these representations clearly reflect each paper's respective political  
affiliations. As the interests of the respective political parties change according to  
developments in the political and social conditions, the choices in linguistic expression in the  
news reports also change, resulting in a move from a relatively conform representation in the  
coverage of the first of the events, to more diversified and conflict-orientated representations  
of the two later events. 
2
Acknowledgements
I would first and foremost like to thank my supervisor, Professor Gunvor Mejdell, for always  
being enthusiastic and supportive of the project, and for giving constructive and invaluable  
feedback throughout the work on this thesis. 
Many thanks to family and friends for continued support throughout what sometimes must  
have seemed like ever-lasting studies. A special thanks also to my fellow students of Arabic  
and Middle Eastern studies for good company in the reading room and on travels across the  
Middle East during the last years.
Finally, my most profound thanks goes to Cecilie for her endless support, encouragement and  
patience. 
3
A note on transliteration and translation
Transliteration has been kept at a minimum in this thesis, and all examples taken from the  
newspaper texts which are used in the analysis are written in Arabic with the English  
translation in brackets beneath it. The aim of the English translations have been to retain as  
much of the effects of the linguistic choices of the original text as possible, and not necessarily  
to write idiomatically correct English. 
All proper names that occur in the text are, however, fully transliterated (except names of  
authors and works used for reference), using the following system:
! ! " d # # $ k
% b & dh ' $ ( l
) t * r + % , m
- th . z / " 0 n
1 j 2 s 3 gh 4 h
5 ! 6 sh 7 f 8 w
9 kh : & ; q < y
Short vowels: a, u, i
Long vowels: !, ", #
Diphtongs: aw and ay
The definite article: al-  (will not be assimilated)
T!  marb" a:$! -a (in plausal form) / -at (in i !fa)#
Nisba-ending: -# (masc) / -iyya (fem)
Hamza: will not be written word initially 
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Introduction
During the summer of 2007, the international media’s attention was directed at the Palestinian  
territories once again. This time however, the reason was not the enduring Israeli-Palestinian  
conflict, but rather internal fighting between Palestinian factions. am!s had won the"  
elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) the year before, but the ruling Fata! 
party lead by President Ma m"d!  "Abb!s (Ab" M!zen) was not willing to give up power 
without a struggle. Open fighting between members of the two factions occurred regularly  
throughout the Palestinian territories, and reached its peak in June 2007 when am!s seized"  
control of the headquarters of the Fata -controlled security apparatus in the Gaza strip. Since!  
then, the territories have been divided between the Fata -controlled West Bank and the!  
am!s-controlled Gaza Strip. Attempts at unity talks have failed time and time again, and the"  
power struggle between the two groups has continued with full effect. The two groups have  
not only fought in the streets of the Palestinian territories with weapons and violence, but also  
in the media. In April 2008, the Al-Jazeera TV channel dedicated one of their weekly 
programmes, Listening Post, to what they called the “equally fierce propaganda battle” taking  
place between Fata  and am!s, in which they claimed that “a media war [....] is being! "  
conducted in the Palestinian territories and has had serious consequences with both groups  
attempting to use television programs and news bulletins to their political advantage” 1. Almost 
a year earlier, international media had informed that what was described as the “ first pro-
am!s Palestinian newspaper”"  had been launched in the Gaza Strip, bearing the name Filas "n"  
(Palestine)2. According to the Reuters report on the event, the launch of this newspaper should  
be seen as a response by am!s to the Fata  domination of Palestinian media. " !
When living for 18 months in the West Bank city of Hebron working for an international  
organisation, I had the chance to observe both how the power struggle between the two major  
Palestinian factions materialised itself on the streets, often including open fighting and  
violence, and how the media covered the events. My attention was drawn to how newspapers  
with different political affiliations often gave different representations of events related to the  
power struggle, and how these representations, while appearing to be neutral, seemingly  
served the purpose of legitimising the actions of one party in the conflict and at the same time  
delegitimise the actions of the other party. 
1  http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/listeningpost/2008/04/200861505544856326.html,  
accessed 23.02.2009.
2   http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03613675.htm, accessed 25.02.2009
7
The aim of this thesis is therefore to show how different choices in linguistic expression made  
by the author(s) contribute to ideological meaning being expressed in such seemingly neutral  
newspaper reports. For this purpose, I have chosen to analyse and compare texts taken from  
the Fata -affiliated ! al- ay!t al-jad"da ! and the am!s-affiliated " Filas "n,"  covering three of the 
most significant events of intra-Palestinian fighting that took place in May and June 2007. The  
theoretical and methodological framework of my study will be discourse analysis, following  
especially the analytical framework developed under the umbrella of critical discourse  
analysis (CDA). 
1. Background
The theoretical and methodological background of discourse analysis will be outlined in  
chapter 2, but I will already now establish that discourse analysis involves examining the  
sociocultural context of the discourse that is to be analysed. This includes the historical,  
political and economical conditions. In this chapter I will therefore firstly provide an outline  
of the historical background of Fata  and am!s, in order to present the roots of their different! "  
ideologies and strategies, and the background for their different positions in the Palestinian  
nationalist cause. I will secondly give a short summary of the main events of the power  
struggle between the two groups following the am!s victory in the 2006 elections, leading"  
up to today’s situation in the Palestinian territories. The last part of the chapter will focus on  
the Palestinian media situation, including a presentation of each of the two newspapers from  
which the texts used for analysis are taken from. 
1.1  Fata!
The origins of what was to be known as arakat al-Ta r"r al-Wa an" al-Filas "n"! # " "  (the 
Palestinian National Liberation Movement), Fata , is to be found in the Palestinian student!  
activist groups that emerged throughout the Arab world in the beginning of the 1950’s. At that  
time, Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism were the dominant ideas in the region, with the goal  
of re-establishing Arab power and to get rid of the influence from the Western colonialist  
powers. Palestinian nationalism as a distinct movement did not exist, as the pre-1948  
Palestinian nationalist leadership had been shattered during the war of 1947-49, and was  
dispersed. Most of the Palestinian refugees therefore turned to the pan-Arab movements and  
the Muslim Brotherhood to find support for their cause, the liberation of their homeland  
(Butenschøn, 2008:346). The concern of many of the younger activists, who were to become  
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the leaders of a new generation of Palestinian nationalist/resistance organisations, was that  
these movements regarded the liberation of Palestine as just a part of the higher goal of  
achieving Arab unity. This new generation of Palestinian nationalists insisted that the  
liberation of Palestine had to be the main priority, and that Arab unity then maybe could be  
achieved as a result of that at a later stage. “Palestine first” was their slogan, and they were  
ready to start an armed resistance against Israel without waiting for the Arab regimes, which  
under the lead of the Egyptian President N! ir did not wish to engage in a military battle with&  
Israel without being certain of a successful result. In Cairo, Y!sir Araf!t, leader of the"  
Palestinian Students’ Union, and his fellow student, al!  Khalaf, were the main propagators' !  
of this “Palestine first” strategy, but the same ideas also won support among youth across the  
Palestinian Diaspora.   
After the Suez-War of 1956, Araf!t and Khalaf ended up in Kuwait where there was a huge"  
Palestinian community, and where they came in contact with groups that shared their view on  
the Palestinian cause. It is in this environment that the creation of Fata  took place. It is not!  
possible to point at a specific date or year when Fata  was officially founded since it took!  
more the shape of a merging of different groups and individuals with a shared view and  
agenda. Khalaf, however, sets the founding date to be 10 October 1959, stating that this was  
the day when “a small group of us met in a discreet house in Kuwait to hammer out the  
organisational structures of Fateh [ sic]” (Cobban, 1984:23). Another of the founders, Kh!lid  
al- assan, claims on his part that the final merging of individual groups into the Fata" ! 
organisation did not take place until 1962 with a conference held in Kuwait (ibid.:23-24). An  
important factor in the establishment of the Fata  organisation was the launch of a magazine!  
called Filas "nun!"  (Our Palestine) in 1959, which was published in Beirut under the leadership  
of Khal#l Waz#r (Ab" Jih!d). The magazine became an important tool in the process of  
spreading their ideas and gain support in the Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Arab  
world, showing already then the importance of the written media as a tool to carry ideological  
meaning. According to Cobban (ibid.:24), the Fata  organisation was established upon!  
agreeing on five main principles that since have remained at the basis of the organisation:
1. The common goal of liberating Palestine
2. The need for armed struggle to obtain this goal
3. Reliance on Palestinian self-organisation 
4. Co-operation with friendly Arab forces
5. Co-operation with friendly international forces
Interestingly, especially in relation to the ongoing struggle with am!s, most of the early"  
leadership of Fata  had connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, out of which its main!  
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political rival would emerge several years later. According to Butenschøn (2008:349),  
however, these leaders' attraction towards the Brotherhood was mainly due to the movement’s  
opposition to the existing Arab regimes and its somewhat militant line against Israel rather  
than its religious significance. When Fata  was established, it was therefore along a secular!  
line with the aim of gathering Palestinians across religious and political lines for the battle of  
liberating their homeland (ibid.). In 1967, the secular standing of the organisation was further  
underlined as the Central Committee changed the formulation of the final goal from “the  
liberation of Palestine”, to “the establishment of a secular, democratic state” in Palestine  
(Cobban, 1984:16). The name Fata , which is the reversed acronym of ! arakat al-Ta r#r al-" !
Wa an# al-Filas #n# has somewhat religious affiliations. The natural acronym of the name$ $  
would have been HATAF, but since this has the meaning “death” in Arabic, the founders  
probably found the reverse Fata  to be more appropriate. Fata  has the meaning “opening”,! !  
“conquest”, “triumph” or “victory” and appears several times in the Quran. 
Fata  began their military campaign against Israel in January 1965 with an unsuccessful attack!  
on water installations in the Galilee region through its first military wing named al- $" ifa%  (the 
storm), and was soon to become the most powerful organisation within the Palestinian  
resistance movement. This was much due to the devastating defeat of the Arab armies in the  
Six-Day War of 1967, which left the Arab world in an ideological crisis. Fata  and Y!sir!  
Araf!t, who at that time had become the leading figure of the organisation, used the defeat to"  
gather support among the broad line of Palestinians for its own agenda of guerrilla fighting  
against Israel. The 1967 War also paved the way for Fata  to gain control over the Palestinian!  
Liberation Organisation, PLO, which had been established in May 1964. The establishment of  
the PLO was initiated at the first Arab League meeting in Cairo in January 1964 where 13  
Arab state leaders were gathered and where “[t]he necessary practical decisions were taken…
in the field of organising the Palestinian people and enabling them to play their role in the  
liberation of their country and their self-determination” (Cobban, 1984:29). The Palestinian  
representative to the meeting, Ahmad Shuqayr#, was given the task of organising the practical  
steps. In May the same year, 422 Palestinian representatives were gathered in Jerusalem where  
they established the PLO with the Palestinian National Council, PNC, as it highest organ, and  
with an Executive Committee that was to function like a cabinet between the sessions of the  
PNC. An army called the Palestinian Liberation Army, PLA, was also established, organised  
as divisions under the armed forces of each Arab state. Araf!t and the Fata  leaders were!"  
sceptical to the establishment of PLO at first, and regarded it as an attempt by Egypt to control  
the Palestinian resistance. However, when the Arab states failed in their military campaign  
against Israel, they were ready to take over the control of the organisation together with a  
coalition of other groups that followed the same guerrilla line, such as the Popular Front for  
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the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which had been established in 1967. In February 1969,  
Fata  took over the Executive Committee and Y!sir Araf!t was elected Chairman. Fata ’s! !"  
grip on the Palestinian nationalist movement was thus secured, and has continued until today.  
A point underlining this is that the current Palestinian President and Chairman of the PLO  
Ma m"d Abb!s, also was among the founding fathers of Fata  in Kuwait in the late 1950’s.! !"
Through continued guerrilla activities against Israel, Fata  grew increasingly strong and!  
brought about a wave of Palestinian nationalist sentiment. Especially important in gaining  
popularity among the Palestinians was the battle of the Jordanian village of Kar!ma in March 
1968. Fata  had established a command centre in the village and Israel launched an attack!  
aimed at driving them out. Despite the enormous superiority of the Israelis concerning number  
of troops and equipment, the Fata  fighters were able to inflict relatively heavy losses on them!  
with support from the Jordanian army, before in the end being forced out (ibid.:42). The  
symbolic effect of the fight put up by the Fata  fighters was tremendous as it showed to the!  
disillusioned Arab world that armed resistance was possible, and consequently thousands of  
people applied to join Fata , and money poured into the organisation (Yapp 1996:304). Even!  
King Hussein himself declared after the battle “we shall all be fedayeen [sic]” (Cobban 
1984:48). The increasing popularity of Fata  and its allied guerrilla groups became a threat to!  
the Jordanian rulers, and despite Fata ’s core ideology stating non-intervention into other!  
Arab states’ internal matters, they were in 1970 thrown into open confrontations with the  
Jordanian security forces (ibid.: 15). During what was to be known as ‘Black September’,  
King Hussein’s troops launched an offensive against the guerrilla groups and the Palestinian  
refugee camps, which in the end lead to Fata  and the other guerrilla groups pulling out of!  
Jordan and re-establish themselves in Lebanon. 
The Fata  leadership tried hard not to get involved in the civil war that broke out in Lebanon!  
in 1975 in line with their core ideology of not involving themselves in the internal affairs of  
Arab states. Instead, they sought to focus on their guerrilla warfare against Israel, carried out  
from the southern parts of Lebanon, which in that period gained the name ‘Fata land’. In!  
1976, however, Araf!t was not able to keep his Fata  fighters out of the fighting after the!"  
Lebanese Christian militias laid siege on two major Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, and  
Fata  and the PLO was thrown into the war at full strength (Fisk 2001:79). !
Strategically, Fata  had at this stage taken a new stand, which was to have a great impact on!  
the future of the Palestinian nationalist cause. By embracing the idea of the creation of a  
Palestinian ‘mini-state’ in the West Bank and Gaza, they showed for the first time that they  
could be ready to pursue a peaceful settlement of the conflict. At the twelfth PNC meeting  
held in Cairo in the summer of 1974, the PLO agreed upon a ten-point programme, which  
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included a point stating that “[t]he PLO will struggle by every means, the foremost of which is  
armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian land and to establish the people’s national, independent  
and fighting sovereignty on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated” (Cobban 1984:62).  
Implicit in this point is the recognition of a possible two-state solution with a future  
Palestinian state alongside Israel on any land liberated, if only as a starting point from where  
to later seek liberation for the whole of Palestine. This new formulation was controversial and  
Fata  and the DFLP were the two main groups that pushed it through. Soon after, PFLP and!  
three other groups pulled out of the PLO Executive Committee in protest and formed the  
‘Rejection Front’. The articulation of this new goal helped Araf!t and the PLO win"  
recognition in diplomatic circles, both in the Arab world and internationally. At the Arab  
Summit in October the same year, the Arab states recognised PLO as the sole legitimate  
representative of the Palestinian people, and in November, Araf!t held his famous speech at"  
the UN, and the PLO was granted observer status at the organisation. The first move had thus  
been made by Fata  and the PLO towards adapting a more diplomatic line, and moving in a!  
direction away from its initial line of gaining results purely through guerilla warfare on  
Palestinian land itself. Other groups, like am!s, were later to build much of their popularity"  
on opposing this direction taken by Fata . It was, however, still many years before the!  
diplomatic line was to result in the setting up of a Palestinian national authority, as the  
diplomatic line in the following years was set back by several factors, among them the PLO’s  
refusal to accept the UN resolution 242 as the USA demanded, the Likud climbing to power in  
Israel and the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978.
Meanwhile in Lebanon, Fata  and other guerrilla groups were still caught up in fighting, and!  
in 1982, Israel invaded the country in order to crush the Palestinian guerrillas. The invading  
army advanced all the way to Beirut where it enclosed the Western part of the city which was  
under Palestinian control. Following continued attacks on the city during the siege, the  
Palestinian leaders had no choice but to engage in negotiations about an evacuation of its  
troops, and on 21 August, the first PLO fighters were evacuated out of Beirut harbour  
(ibid.:124). Nine days later, Y!sir Araf!t himself left, thus ending the official Fata /PLO!"  
presence in Lebanon. 
Following the retreat from Beirut, the PLO leadership resettled in Tunis. The withdrawal from  
Lebanon had left both the PLO and Fata  somewhat split after the failure to reach success!  
both on the diplomatic and the military level, and with Syria lending support to factions that  
opposed Araf!t and his leadership. Araf!t, Fata  and the PLO had reached what Barry Rubin!" "  
in his book Revolution Until Victory?  (1994:65) calls the lowest point in their history. During  
the years following Lebanon, Araf!t made an attempt at reopening the diplomatic way"  
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through Jordan’s King Hussein, but the attempts once again failed, and the Palestinian cause  
was partly left in the shadow of the Iran-Iraq war. This was to change dramatically with the  
start of the first Palestinian intif! a&  (uprising) which started in December 1987 inside the  
territories, and which again brought the Palestinian nationalist cause, Araf!t, Fata  and the!"  
PLO back to the centre stage of international politics. Being displaced in Tunis, far away from  
the Palestinian territories themselves, Fata  had seen the necessity of strengthening its!  
institutional networks inside the West Bank and Gaza, which would come to lay the basis for  
their important role during the intif! a (Parsons 2005:35). Islamist groups, especially the#  
Muslim Brotherhood, had already spent many years building up social institutions in the  
Palestinian territories, which gained them a lot of popular support. After having initially been  
surprised by the start of the uprising, the PLO leadership soon took control through the  
establishment of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which co-
ordinated the actions of the leading nationalists factions within the PLO (ibid.:36). The split  
that had occurred after Lebanon was thus ended and Araf!t again emerged as the undisputed"  
leader of the Palestinian nationalist cause. 
The renewed strength of Araf!t and the Fata /PLO leadership made it possible for them to!"  
reopen the diplomatic line towards the international community, especially after King Hussein  
in July 1988 renounced Jordan’s claim for the West Bank, leading the way for the PLO to  
proclaim independence for the state of Palestine in November the same year, based on UN  
resolution 181 from 1947. Following pressure by the USA, Araf!t in December then finally"  
uttered the words that could allow for direct talks between the American government and the  
PLO, accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338, recognising Israel’s right to existence and  
renouncing terrorism (ibid.:40). The ideology of Fata  and the PLO had thus taken yet another!  
major step away from its guerrilla history in the direction of moderation. At the same time as  
the intif! a provided Araf!t with support to seek this moderation, it also brought about a new# "  
expression of the Islamic sentiments that had been growing within the territories for many  
years already, in the establishment of am!s (cf.1.2). In the beginning, am!s did not" "  
compose any real political threat to Fata  and the PLO on a higher level, and they did not!  
enter the UNLU. On the streets, however, am!s soon gained a solid following and the"  
relationship between Araf!t supporters and am!s members became strained (Schanzer""  
2008:25). Interestingly, Schanzer describes how the first public struggle between the two  
parties in fact took the form of a propaganda struggle, with both groups spreading leaflets  
calling for support for their own cause. 
The first direct talks between the PLO and the USA did not lead to any concrete results, and  
by 1990 they were abolished, with Araf!t and the rest of the PLO leadership still sitting in"  
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Tunis. Once again a diplomatic initiative had failed, and when Araf!t refused to condemn the"  
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the situation became even worse for the PLO.  
Parsons (2005:43) identifies three levels on which the PLO was severely hit by this decision.  
Firstly, it lead to a severe loss of income for the organisation as taxes adding up to 8 billion  
dollar collected from the huge number of Palestinians residing in Kuwait, were lost. Secondly,  
most Arab states were alienated from the organisation, especially the oil-rich states like  
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and thirdly, it lead to the organisation loosing its credibility and  
goodwill among the western countries. At the same time, the Palestinians living inside the  
territories were facing harsher conditions as a result of Israel’s hard reactions to the intif! a,#  
and demanded some results to come from their struggle. am!s on their side gained huge"  
support among the Palestinians for their line towards Israel (cf.1.2). Faced with this situation,  
Araf!t and Fata  engaged in what was to be known as the Oslo channel, which eventually!"  
would lead to the signing by Israel and the PLO of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in  
September 1993. With the DoP, Araf!t and the PLO leadership were finally in a position to"  
return to the territories, and to do so in the form of a government of an internationally  
recognised Palestinian entity, although an entity that only covered parts of the Gaza Strip and  
Jericho. Fata  had thus completed its transformation from a guerrilla organisation calling for!  
the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state from the  
Jordan river to the Mediterranean, to the leaders of a government which mandate was built on  
diplomatic agreements with the former ‘enemy’. Araf!t returned to Gaza on 1 July 1994 as"  
President of the Palestinian National Authority (PA), but within the territories he faced a huge  
opposition against the agreement with Israel by groups that viewed it as a betrayal against the  
Palestinian people and its cause. am!s was at the forefront of this opposition, and sought to"  
undermine the authority of Araf!t and the PA, mainly through a wave of attacks against Israel"  
carried out by its military wing Kat! ib al-Shah"d Izz al-D"n al-Qass!m ! " (the al-Qass!m 
Brigades). These attacks increased the support for am!s among a large segment of the"  
population, and thus put Araf!t and the PA in a difficult situation. Israel and the USA"  
demanded that it put an end to these attacks in order for the peace process to continue, while  
Araf!t probably knew that a crack down on am!s could make him unpopular among the""  
population. It was also important to uphold the idea of national unity among the Palestinians  
as a basis for legitimacy for his rule. Leading up to the first formal elections for the PA in  
January 1996, Fata  and am!s met in Cairo to discuss a settlement to the growing conflict,! "  
but it was, as should be the case several times in the years to come, unsuccessful (Schanzer  
2008:44). As am!s decided to boycott the 1996 elections in protest of the Oslo accords,"  
Fata 's victory was not threatened, and their grip on the PA was even further consolidated.!  
am!s still continued their attacks in the years to come, with the PA subsequently arresting"  
14
hundreds of am!s members in an attempt to quell the organisation (ibid.:68). National unity"  
and the PA as a unifying national project was thus clearly not happening, and Araf!t kept"  
loosing popularity among the population to am!s and other rejectionist groups. In addition,"  
people inside Fata  started to demand reforms of the organisation, especially in the leadership,!  
which mainly consisted of men from the ‘old guard’, i.e. the old leadership from the pre-PA  
period. In July 2000, the Oslo peace process came to an end with the failure of the so-called  
Camp David 2 talks between Araf!t and then Israeli PM Ehud Barak. One reason for this was"  
that Araf!t, pressured from the difficult situation inside the territories and the growing"  
support of am!s, was not willing to give any more concessions. The failure of these talks"  
once again increased Araf!t’s popularity within the territories, and when the second intif! a#"  
broke out in September, the different Palestinian factions seemed more unified than ever with  
even am!s for the first time officially participating in a meeting held by the PA (Tamimi"  
2007:199). This was not to last long, however, as Araf!t soon again found himself under"  
pressure from Israel and the USA to control the different Palestinian factions as the intif! a#  
continued. His failure, or unwillingness, to do so, lead the Americans to demand that he  
delegated some of his power within the PA by creating the office of a Prime Minister in order  
for there being any chance of the peace process getting back on track. Ma m"d Abb!s was! "  
appointed the first PM, but did not survive long in the position. The relationship between him  
and Araf!t quickly soured over disputes of power, and by the population he was seen as being"  
only a puppet controlled by Israel and the USA (ibid.:203-204). In the end, Fata ’s situation!  
suffered tremendously from the second intif! a. Many of its leaders were killed or detained by#  
the Israelis, some of the remaining leaders, including Abb!s, were seen as being more allies"  
of Israel and the USA rather than loyal to the Palestinian cause. The infrastructure of the PA  
was in ruins and Israel had re-occupied the West Bank and Gaza, and in addition, the  
movement was hard hit by a culture of corruption. Together with the fact that its diplomatic  
line had not delivered peace and prosperity to the Palestinian people, these factors lead to a  
popularity crisis for the organisation that had been the undisputed leader of the Palestinian  
nationalist cause since the early 1960’s. This was the situation when Araf!t passed away in"  
November 2004 and Abb!s replaced him as Fata ’s leader. The elections for the Palestinian!"  
Legislative Council in January 2006 made apparent the failure of Fata  in accomplishing their!  
goal of national unity, and that they had distanced themselves from the people they claimed to  
legitimately represent. At the same time it clearly showed the strength that am!s had built up"  
over 15 years. 
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1.2  am!s"
arakat al-Muq!wama al-Isl!miyya!  (The Islamic Resistance Movement), am!s, emerged at"  
the beginning of the first intif! a, with the first communiqué signed by the organisation being#  
released on 14 December 1987 (Tamimi 2007:11). The acronym am!s#  has the meaning ‘zeal’ 
in Arabic. The background of the organisation that was to become the most serious contender  
to Fata ’s leading role in the Palestinian nationalist movement is to be found in the Islamist!  
organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood. The leader of the Gaza branch of the Brotherhood,  
which was to develop into am!" s, was A ma! d Y!s#n who since the 1960’s had built up the 
organisation there. Across the Arab world, the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War left a huge segment of the population disillusioned, since they had seen the pan-
Arabism of N! ir as the solution to its problems. When this failed, many turned to religion&  
instead, and Islamist groupings experienced a surge in popularity. In the years following  
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli authorities viewed the secular  
nationalism headed by Fata  as the main threat on the Palestinian side, and focused on the!  
battle against it. Islamist groups such as the Brotherhood under Y!s#n’s leadership were at the  
same time given more or less free hands to go about with their activities. The Brotherhood had  
at that time developed the idea that da wa"  (preaching) should be their main concern instead of  
open military battle, as was the strategy of Fata  and the other secular resistance groups!  
(ibid.:35). Due to the non-intervention policy of Israel towards the Brotherhood, Y!s#n was  
able to establish social institutions in Gaza which would provide the organisation with massive  
popular support. The first of these was called al-Jama iyya al-isl!miyya " (the Islamic Society) 
which was established in 1967 and provided sports activities, recreational trips, scouting  
activities and public lectures for the youth (ibid.:36). In the early 1970’s, an even more  
comprehensive institution was established under the name al-Mujam a al-isl!m" " (the Islamic 
Centre), which also was responsible for establishing mosques, kindergartens, schools and  
clinics all over the Gaza Strip (ibid.). In 1978, the Islamic University was established in the  
Gaza Strip under the lead of the Brotherhood, which was to have a significant effect on the  
movement’s ability to spread its ideology. Through the different institutions it controlled, the  
Brotherhood was able to build up a network covering most areas of the society in the Gaza  
Strip, providing, as Beverly Milton-Edwards (2000:141) puts it: “something for everyone,  
from the cradle to the grave”.
As mentioned, the strategy of the Brotherhood in the 1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s  
concerning Israel was that of non-confrontation. The leading thought, especially among the  
old guard, was that the society had to be based fully on Islam before one could stage a battle  
against the Zionists, and that the blame for the defeats of the Arab regimes was to be found in  
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the fact that these were secular regimes which had left their Islamic base (Tamimi 2007). The  
same argumentation was used for not joining the secular nationalist movement in their armed  
struggle. At the same time as Y!s#n built up his network inside the territories, the Islamic  
movement also became strong in the Palestinian student milieus in the Diaspora, such as in  
Kuwait, where Fata  had been formed some twenty years earlier. Among the leaders here was!  
Kh!lid Mish"al, who today is regarded as the leader of am!s. This younger generation of"  
Islamists challenged the strategy of non-confrontation, as they sought to participate more  
directly in the nationalist cause on the ground, and launched the idea of establishing a jih!d" 
project in Palestine (Rabbani 2008:67). In 1983, a conference was held in Jordan with  
delegates from the Palestinian Brotherhood both from inside the territories and exile to discuss  
the organisational matters concerning the launch of this project, and this conference is referred  
to by Mish al " as laying “the foundation stone for the creation of am!s” (Ibid.:68)."  
Preparations for the start of an armed campaign got under way in Gaza, and in 1984 A!mad 
Y!s#n was arrested by the Israelis on suspicion of having been involved in buying weapons  
(Tamimi 2007:46). He was released a year later as part of a prisoner exchange deal, and  
continued the preparation for the launch of an armed struggle against Israel in the framework  
of the Palestinian Brotherhood. The call for actions to be taken came especially from the  
younger generation in the territories who had lived their whole life under occupation. Gilles  
Kepel (2003:152) points to the fact that half the population in the occupied Palestinian  
territories was under fifteen years, and over 70 percent was under the age of 30. Most of them  
were educated, many from the Islamic University and other Islamic institutes, but had little or  
no hope of finding work due to the economical situation and the occupation, and therefore had  
little to lose by engaging in a violent conflict. This group, the shab!b in Arabic, thus became 
the main movers in the intif! a when it broke out in December 1987. #
Despite most observers regard am!s as having being established at the outbreak of the"  
intif! a, Mis# h al " insists that am!s in reality was formed in the years following the Jordan"  
conference in 1983, and thus already existed as an organisation prior to the intif! a (Rabbani#  
2008:68). The organisation and network building that had been undertaken by the Palestinian  
Brotherhood in the territories and the Diaspora undoubtedly played a major role in helping  
am!s take a leading role during the uprising and being able to challenge Fata  and the PLO" !  
and their UNLU. 
The challenge from am!s became even stronger when they entered the political arena by"  
launching their charter on 18 August 1988, thereby presenting to the population a clear  
ideological and strategic alternative to the line of Fata . The charter includes 36 articles and!  
lays out the principles for how the organisation would fuse Palestinian nationalism and  
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Islamism. In Article one, it is declared that “[t]he Movement's programme is Islam. From it, it  
draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man” ( am!s"  
covenant, 1988)3. Article Six goes on to proclaim that the movement “strives to raise the  
banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine”, thus making it clear that the aspiration is to  
establish a state built on Islamic principles. Concerning the fight for the liberation of Palestine,  
the charter states that jih!d is an individual duty of every Muslim, and that it is “necessary to  
instill [sic] the spirit of Jihad [sic] in the heart of the nation so that they would confront the  
enemies and join the ranks of the fighters”. In its charter, am!s also clarifies its view on the"  
secular nationalist movements, and on the diplomatic line undertaken by Araf!t and the PLO."  
Negotiations and peace talks are clearly dismissed in Article 13: “There is no solution for the  
Palestinian question except through Jihad [sic]. Initiatives, proposals and international  
conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavours. The Palestinian people know better  
than to consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with.”Although accepting that the  
PLO stems from the same people as themselves, am!s takes a clear stand against the secular"  
line of the organisation, stating: “Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology.  
Attitudes, conduct and decisions stem from ideologies. That is why, with all our appreciation  
for The Palestinian Liberation Organisation - and what it can develop into - and without  
belittling its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future  
Islamic Palestine with the secular idea.”
One of the most controversial points of the charter is not found among the articles, but rather  
in the preamble, where it is referred to a statement by Hassan al-Bann!, the founder of the  
Muslim Brotherhood, saying: “ Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will  
obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it ”. To make am!s refrain from this point, and"  
accept the existence of the Israeli state has been one of the main demands from the  
international community towards the organisation in order to open a dialogue. In later years,  
there has been a tendency among am!s leaders to not refer to the charter, but rather to mark"  
some kind of distance to it. Tamimi (2007:149) cites for example Mis h al"  saying that the 
charter “should not be regarded as the fundamental ideological frame of reference from which  
the movement derives its position, or on the basis of which it justifies its actions”. Tamimi  
also claims that there has been an ongoing process within the Political Bureau of the  
organisation to rewrite the charter since 2003, but that the election victory in 2006 halted this  
process, as the leadership did not want it to look as if they had given in to external pressure of  
3   English translation from the Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. URL:  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/Hamas.asp, accessed 20.10.2009. All following  
citations from the covenant are from this site. 
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changing the charter (ibid.:150). Based on this, the charter still stands as the primary  
ideological document of am!s."
With the launch of its charter, am!s was able to present a clear alternative to the line of Fata" ! 
and soon gained support from those who were opposed to the diplomatic efforts undertaken by  
Araf!t and the PLO. As Fata  moved further away from their guerrilla background, am!s! ""  
was in place to fill this role and gained popular support. At the same time, Israel felt  
increasingly threatened by the Islamist group, and launched a campaign against it towards the  
end of 1988. Mass arrests among the leadership were conducted, and in May 1989, Y!s#n was  
again detained. However, the arrests only lead to a further radicalisation of the movement as  
younger members who were generally more open for the use of violence emerged to fill the  
vacancies in the leadership. The hard line of Israel towards the movement also increased its  
legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In 1991, am!s' military wing, the al-Qass!m"  
Brigades, was founded and soon launched a series of attacks on Israeli targets. The Brigades  
are named after the founder and leader of a resistance group from the uprising against the  
British and the Zionists in the 1930’s, thus establishing a bound between am!s and the"  
historical resistance movement. The increase in violence lead to Israel deporting more than  
400 hundred prominent am!s members to Lebanon in December 1992 in an operation that"  
was only to help am!s gain international sympathy, and which ended in an UN resolution"  
calling for the release of the prisoners (Kepel 2003:327). While am!s increased its power"  
based mainly on its clear line of confrontation, and opposition to all peace initiatives, Fata! 
and the PLO saw its own power diminish, and embarked on the Oslo process in an attempt to  
restore it. With the PA in place in Gaza following the signing of the Declaration of Principles,  
Araf!t could start using his security apparatus to target the opposition, both based on his own"  
wish to reduce the power of am!s, and on pressure from Israel and the USA to control the"  
different factions as a part of the peace agreement. The PA’s attempted crack-down on am!s"  
suffered a severe blow, however, when A!mad Y!s#n was released from Israeli prison in 1997 
following the infamous assassination attempt on am!s’ Political Bureau leader, Kh!lid"  
Mish"al, by the Mossad. Back in Gaza, Y!s#n could again actively take the leadership of  
am!s, and strengthen it further."
The tension between the PA and am!s only increased in the years leading up to the second"  
intif! a, with thousands of am!s members being arrested and many being tortured (Tamimi# "  
2007:195). The hard line adopted by Araf!t at the Camp David meeting in July 2000 and the"  
subsequent outbreak of the second intif! a, however, were to bring the two parties closer#  
together, at least for a short period. As the violence increased, and the pressure on Araf!t"  
became stronger from the USA and Israel, it soon soured again with heavy clashes between  
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the two factions taking place in Gaza in December 2001. The retaliation attacks from Israel  
following the violence hit the infrastructure and the economy of the PA hard and helped  
undermine its power. Araf!t himself was put under house arrest by the Israeli army, and these"  
factors only boosted the effective power of am!s. Schanzer (2008:77) notes that by 2003,"  
am!s had created a parallel government to the PA’s and controlled a parallel network of"  
social services. The popularity of the movement was displayed when about 200,000 people  
turned to the streets of Gaza to follow the funeral of Y!s#n after he was assassinated on 22  
March 2004 (ibid.:80). The assassination of the leader Y!s#n was followed by the  
assassinations of the two next persons to be named as leaders of the organisation, leading  
am!s to decide not to name publicly their leader for the future, even though it is commonly"  
acknowledged that Kh!lid Mish a" l is the current leader. Although the assassinations led to  
some weakening of the leadership on short terms, the power of am!s was not affected, and"  
when the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon evacuated all Israeli settlers and army personnel  
from the Gaza Strip in the fall of 2005, am!s was ready to strengthen the grip they had built"  
up there. For many Palestinians at that time, it was viewed as a victory for the line of  
confrontation lead by am!s, in contrast to the moderate line of Fata . This was the situation" !  
within the Palestinian territories when am!s decided to change its political strategy and take"  
part in the elections called for by Araf!t’s successor, Ma m"d Abb!s, to be held in January!" "  
2006. 
1.3 The 2006 elections and escalation of the conflict
The decision by am!s to join the elections was made after a long discussion within the"  
organisation, and Tamimi (2007:211) points to the main factors behind the decision as being  
the failure of the peace process that it opposed, the disappearance of Araf!t from the political"  
scene, the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and, not least, the disillusionment of the population  
towards the PA. It was well known in the Palestinian society that corruption was a major  
problem within Fata  and the PLO, and am!s made it one of their main points to put an end! "  
to this if they came to power, promising change and reform, which also was the name they 
gave their list for the elections. The election results on 26 January 2006 showed that am!s"  
had won a surprisingly huge victory, taking 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative  
Council, while Fata  only won 45. Attempts to form a national unity government lead by!  
am!s failed due to, amongst other things, the unwillingness of Fata  to join such a" !  
constellation, and thus am!s formed its own government which took office on 29 March"  
2006. The organisation that had build much of its popularity on opposing the moderate line of  
Fata , and the creation of the PA as a result of the Oslo process, was thus suddenly in charge.!  
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It was clear, however, that Fata  was not ready to give up power, and Abb!s issued several! "  
Presidential decrees that transferred authority from the ministries to his own office on several  
areas, including the police force, the media and the control over border crossing points  
(ibid.:229). This meant that the government of am!s did not have control over the police"  
force, and chaos soon emerged on the streets of Gaza, as the Fata -loyal police refused to!  
follow orders from am!s and stayed away from the streets. am!s, in a response to this, put" "  
up its own security force, the Executive Force ( =>?@ABCDE FGHDE), under the Interior Ministry in 
April, and on 17 May, the world media reported that the police force loyal to President Abb!s"  
were deployed onto the streets of Gaza in order to face this newly established am!s force" 4. 
For the first time, two Palestinian forces were deployed on the streets to guard the political  
interests of one Palestinian party against another Palestinian party.
Heavy clashes between Fata -loyal and am!s-loyal forces took place throughout the summer! "  
and autumn of 2006, both on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The attempts by Fata  to!  
undermine the rule of the am!s government were supported by the decision of several"  
Western countries to boycott the government and put a blockade on all economical transfers to  
it, which made the living conditions very difficult. At the same time, money was given to  
President Abb!s for him to build up a new Presidential guard consisting of 10,000 troops"  
(Tamimi 2007:229). As the tensions escalated between the two groups, several attempts were  
made to bring them together with the prospect of establishing the basis for a national unity  
government but all the initiatives failed until February 2007, when the Mecca agreement was  
signed after an initiative from the Saudi royal family. At that time the conflict had reached the  
stage of being on the brink of a full-scale civil war, with around 150 Palestinians being killed  
in factional fighting since October 2006 (Esposito 2007:148). The Mecca agreement laid the  
foundation for the establishment of a unity government which came about on 17 March, by  
putting stress on “banning the shedding of the Palestinian blood and to take all measures and  
arrangements to prevent the shedding of the Palestinian blood and to stress on the importance  
of national unity as basis for national steadfastness and confronting the occupation and to  
achieve the legitimate national goals of the Palestinian people and adopt the language of  
dialogue as the sole basis for solving the political disagreements on the Palestinian arena.” 5
Despite the leaders of the two factions calling for national unity, dialogue and the end of intra-
Palestinian fighting, tensions remained high. Clashes continued, escalating in mid-May with  
47 Palestinians being killed and hundreds injured within the period of one week (Schanzer  
4   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4989226.stm, accessed 27.10.2009.
5   http://www.fmep.org/analysis/analysis/the-mecca-agreement, accessed 27.10.09
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2008:105). The unity that was still being officially proclaimed by the leaders was clearly not  
seen in the streets, and on 7 June 2007, full-scale civil war broke out in Gaza, which resulted  
in am!s taking over all security compounds and PA buildings within a week, and to"  
President Abb!s dissolving the unity government on 14 June. am!s did not accept the""  
dissolution and the new emergency government put up by Abb!s led by the former Finance"  
Minister Sal!m Fayy!d, and less than three months after the establishment of a national unity  
government, the territories were thus divided into a Fata -ruled West Bank and a am!s-ruled! "  
Gaza Strip, after a civil war which left around 160 Palestinians dead and several hundreds  
wounded in the streets of Gaza (ibid.:108). These casualties came in addition to the 616 that  
had already been killed in internal Palestinian clashes since the January 2006 elections,  
according to Reuters on 6 June 20076. Both parties were now seeking to secure control in their  
respective areas, and this was done partly by cracking down on members and supporters of the  
other party with arrests, beatings, abductions, etc. The media was also targeted, as both parties  
saw the importance of being presented as the legitimate rulers, and not as the ones responsible  
for the violence and suffering that took place (cf.1.4). 
1.4 The Palestinian media situation
Press and printing are free. Furthermore, freedom of opinion should be entitled to  
every Palestinian individual who attains the absolute right to express his opinion in  
a free manner either verbally, in writing, or drawing, as a different means of  
expression and information.– Article 2, the 1995 Palestinian Press Law7 .
The Palestinian Press Law was signed by Y!sir Araf!t on 25 July 1995 and replaced the"  
Israeli military regulations on the press, which had been in place in the territories since the  
War of 1967. The PA’s Ministry of Information was established already one year prior to this,  
before Araf!t himself arrived in Gaza, showing the emphasis the newly established"  
Palestinian National Authority put on organising the media and information sector in the  
territories (Jamal 2000:50). With the establishment of the PA following the Oslo accords, a  
new era started for the Palestinian media, but despite the positive tone of the article cited  
above, the conditions were not to improve significantly. 
The first daily newspapers in Palestine emerged in 1929 under the British mandate following  
the riots that evolved during 1929. During the first years of the mandate period, the press in  
6   http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3409548,00.html, accessed 27.10.09
7   My translation of the Arabic version from the website of the Palestinian National Authority  
Ministry of Information, URL: http://www.minfo.gov.ps/Docs/printing%20law.doc, accessed  
05.10.2009. All following citations from the Press Law are from this site. 
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Palestine enjoyed more freedom than the press in neighbouring countries, but in 1933 the  
British rulers issued a Publications Law which limited that freedom severely (Ayalon 1995).  
In 1945, they further restricted the freedom by introducing the Emergency Regulations, which  
established the censorship mechanism, and which Israel was to adopt after their occupation of  
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 (Nossek &Rinnawi 2003). In the meantime, the two  
areas had been under the rule of Jordan and Egypt respectively with the media falling under  
their regulations. The first newspaper to be published after 1967, inside what was now the  
occupied Palestinian territories, was al-Quds (Jerusalem), which was a merger of two dailies  
that had been published in Jerusalem during the Jordanian rule, al-Dif'" (the defence) and al-
Jih!d (Jamal 2000:46). Al-Quds was known to be a pro-Jordanian newspaper, but remained  
the only Palestinian daily to be published within the territories for four years, and is still today  
the largest Palestinian newspaper. Following the ‘Black September’ of 1970 and the  
evacuation to Lebanon, the Fata  leadership also turned their focus to the occupied territories!  
and to mobilising the population there for the cause of the establishment of a Palestinian state  
some time in the future. They realised that the media could play an important role in this  
aspect, and in 1972 two new dailies were established by leading PLO figures in the territories  
as an attempt to reduce the influence of the pro-Jordanian al-Quds (ibid.). They were called 
al-Fajr (The Dawn) and al-Sha"b (The People), and had a clear political aim of mobilising for  
the Palestinian cause fronted by Fata  and attacking the leading pro-Jordanian figures in the!  
West Bank (ibid.). The Fata  leadership saw the media as an important tool in the struggle!  
both against the occupation, and against the other Palestinian groups that might challenge their  
political position as leaders of the Palestinian national cause. The other Palestinian factions  
present in the territories also looked for opportunities to get their message out to a broader  
audience, and as a result a whole range of newspapers with different political affiliations  
emerged in the following years. Of these can be mentioned al-M"th!q (the Covenant) and al-
"Ahd (the Promise) supported by the PFLP, al-Darb (the Path) supported by the DFLP, and  
Hud! al-Isl!m (the Way of Islam) representing the Islamic movement (Nossek &Rinnawi 
2003:188). In 1986, a daily called al-Nah!r (the Day) was established, taking a pro-Jordanian  
line after the former pro-Jordanian al-Quds had now adopted a pro-PLO line instead (Jamal 
200:47).
The politicisation of the Palestinian newspapers was evident right from the start, with virtually  
no independent papers being established, something which of course has had a major impact  
on the journalistic traditions in the West Bank and Gaza. The strong affiliations with the  
various political factions restricted the journalists’ freedom in reporting and in addition, the  
Israeli censorship also represented a major impediment. In accordance with the Israeli military  
orders for the occupied territories, all newspapers had to pass through the military censor who  
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would then delete any material that could possibly harm Israeli interests. Newspapers were  
closed for periods of time and journalists and editors were arrested and deported if the Israeli  
authorities believed that they had failed to live up to their rules and regulations (Jamal  
2000:47). 
With the establishment of the PA, the formal Israeli censorship of the Palestinian press was  
removed and many hoped for better times for Palestinian journalism. However, the new  
leadership soon demonstrated that they intended to keep the media under tight control. The  
newly established Ministry of Information showed its strength already in July 1994 when it  
announced that the pro-Jordanian al-Nah!r was not allowed into the areas controlled by the 
PA, which effectively lead to the paper’s fall (ibid.:48). The message was thus sent out to the  
other media institutions, and was understood to such an extend that the other surviving major  
daily at the time, al-Quds, did not even report on the closure of its rival (ibid.). The PA was 
well aware of the challenges it faced on the ground in the Palestinian territories concerning  
creating legitimacy for their authority and their agreement with the Israeli ‘enemy’, and sought  
from the start to make sure that the Palestinian media took part in this legitimating process.  
Two new newspapers were therefore established with close links to the PA, al-Hay!t al-jad"da 
(the New Day) lead by former PLO ambassador to Moscow Nab#l Amru, and " al-Ayy!m (the 
Days) headed by Akram Haniyya, a close consultant to Araf!t and former editor of " al-Sha"b. 
The former of the two is by many regarded as replacing the official PLO mouthpiece Filas "n"  
al-Thawra (Palestine the Revolution) while the latter took the place of al-Fajr and al-Sha b."  
According to Amal Jamal (2001:266), the names of these two dailies reflect “the passage from  
revolutionary and mobilising journalism towards new functions that fitted the stage of  
administrative centralisation, internal pacification and state-building”. The PA leadership  
needed the press to help establish a consensus among the population for its national project,  
and thus needed to control it in more or less overt ways. One mean of control was to patronise  
the press through offering financial support. The bad economical situation in the territories  
made it almost impossible for privately owned newspapers and magazines to survive without  
some kind of financial support, and the PA therefore subsidised the newspapers by for  
example paying for advertisements and subscriptions (Nossek & Rinnawi 2003:188). 
The Press Law also offered ways for the PA to control the media despite the clear declaration  
on a free press as cited in the article above. In principle, the PA opened for everyone who  
wished to start a media outlet within the territories, even groups clearly in opposition to their  
policies. Parts of the law, however, are written in such an ambiguous way that they are open  
for interpretation, and can subsequently be used by the authorities to restrict this oppositional  
press. Article 8 of the law is one example of this, as it states that journalists are required to:
24
(2) Perform the journalistic work in an objective, integrative and balanced manner.
(3) Strive for accuracy, honesty and objectivity when commenting on news and events.
(4) Avoid publishing anything that can cause violence, fanaticism and hatred, or give  
rise to racism and sectarianism.
By referring to arbitrary terms such as ‘honesty’, ‘objectivity’, ‘balanced manner’, etc., the PA  
has left it open for them to define the meaning of these terms at any given time, and thereby  
granted themselves the right to define ‘the truth’ (Jamal 2001:273). Journalists and editors  
who do not follow this official ‘truth’, will then face the risk of being punished as they have  
violated the law. In addition, Article 37 forbids publishing of any piece of writing that “do  
harm to the national unity or incite the perpetration of crimes or spread hatred, loathing, split  
and strife and sectarian agitation between members of the society”. The most obvious  
interpretation of this article is that any criticism of the PA and their state-building project  
would be viewed as an attack on the ‘national unity’, and thus as a violation of the law. Based  
on this law, the PA was able to confront the oppositional press if they crossed the line of what  
they regarded as tolerable critic against the authorities. The Palestinian Human Rights  
Monitoring Group (PHRMG) had in November 1999 recorded 50 violations against  
Palestinian journalists committed by Palestinian security forces since the establishment of the  
PA in 19948. Publications affiliated with am!s were especially targeted, such as the " al-Wa an"  
(the Homeland) newspaper, established in April 1995. Before it was finally closed after just  
one year of existence, it had been closed several times for longer or shorter periods by the PA  
due to its content (Jamal 2000:52). After the closure of al-Wa an" , am!s decided to publish a"  
weekly in the name of the Islamic National Salvation Party called al-Ris!la (the Message), 
which was established in January 1997 (ibid.). This publication, together with the weekly al-
Istiql!l (the Independence), published by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, represented the main  
oppositional written media in Palestine during the first years of the PA. 
As the popularity of am!s grew in the territories, they were able to confront the monopoly"  
that the PA was trying to build up. Leading up to the 2006 elections, am!s showed how"  
important it considered the media to be in influencing the population when it launched its own  
TV station called Al-Aq !% . Following the elections, President Abb!s transferred the control of"  
the media to his own office, but this did not prevent the launch of the first daily newspaper in  
the Gaza Strip on 3 May 2007, called Filas "n"  (Palestine). Although the editor in the first issue  
declared that the paper was to be a paper for all Palestinians, no matter what political  
affiliations, it was clear that it was closely linked to am!s, which lead international news"  
8   http://www.phrmg.org/monitor1999/nov99-introduction.htm, accessed 23.04.2009
25
agencies to state that it was the “first pro- am!s Palestinian newspaper”" 9. The front page of 
the first issue supported this point by showing a big picture of the am!s Prime Minister"  
Haniyya accompanying an interview with him. 
The split following the June 2007 fighting only made conditions worse for the Palestinian  
media, as both parties sought to control the media outlets. A result of this was that the West  
Bank government of Sal!m Fayy!d banned the distribution in the West Bank of the two Gaza  
newspapers al-Ris!la and Filas "n"  immediately after the am!s takeover of the Gaza Strip on"  
14 June. Following the same line, am!s banned the distribution in Gaza of the two West"  
Bank papers al-Ayy!m and al- ay!t al-jad"da!  in July 2008, the latter still being banned at the 
time of writing. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), stated in a report dated February  
2008 that the “[…] split between the West Bank and Gaza had a ripple effect on the  
Palestinian media, with increasing factionalism within the media and the targeting of media  
seen as aligned with specific groups”10. Reporters Without Borders (RSF), supports this view  
in a report on their website, stating that “[s]ince June 2007, the media has been split in two  
between those close to the Palestinian Authority and those linked to am!s – suffering the"  
same threats and physical assaults on each side. Journalists with links to am!s are"  
summoned, questioned and arrested on the West Bank by the security forces of the Palestinian  
Authority, while pro-Fata  journalists are regularly threatened by am!s police. The year! "  
2008 saw an unprecedented upsurge in press freedom violations.” 11
In the RSF Press Freedom Index of 2009 the Palestinian territories was rated as number 161  
out of a total 175 countries12, showing the severe problems the Palestinian media faces on a  
daily basis. It is within this framework that the journalists and editors have to choose which  
discourse to follow when reporting on the events that take place in the streets of the  
Palestinian territories.
9   http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03613675.htm, accessed 25.02.2009
10   http://cpj.org/2008/02/attacks-on-the-press-2007-israel-and-the-occupied.php , accessed  
03.03.09
11   http://www.rsf.org/en-rapport147-Palestinian_territories.html , accessed 27.10.09
12   http://www.rsf.org/en-classement1003-2009.html , accessed 27.10.09
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1.5  Al- ay!t al-Jad"da"
Al- ay!t al-jad"da!  was established in 1995 by Nab#l Amru, a former PLO ambassador to"  
Moscow who was closely linked with Araf!t and the PA. The newspaper was therefore from"  
the start regarded as an official mouthpiece for the Fata -lead PA, supported by the fact that!  
most of the paper’s journalists are paid directly by the PA 13. According to a poll by the 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre from 1998, it was the third largest Palestinian  
paper, being read by 13,7 % of the population 14. The paper has been banned from the Gaza 
Strip by the am!s government there since the summer of 2008."
1.6  Filas "n#
The daily newspaper Filas "n" , ‘Palestine’, was launched on 3 May 2007 in the Gaza strip. Its  
editor in chief is the well-known Palestinian media personality Mu af! al- aww!f. From the&$ '  
outset, it was clear that the paper was closely affiliated with am!s, with the am!s PM" "  
Ism( )l"  Haniyya holding a speech at the launching ceremony in Gaza. The editorial of the first  
issue clearly states that the paper shall be for all Palestinians, no matter what political  
affiliations, and that it is open for all different views to be expressed. The Reuters news  
agency, however, called it a pro- am!s newspaper!  in their reports on the launch, and al-
aww!f himself was reported as saying that the owners were close to am!s' " 15. Initially, the 
paper was published separately in the West Bank and Gaza, but since 14 June 2007, its  
distribution has been banned in the West Bank by the Fata  rule there. !
2. Theory and Methodology
The theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis will be discourse analysis, and  
Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis theory and method will be the basis for the  
analysis. In this chapter I will give an overview of the theoretical stand of discourse analysis  
and its link to power and media.
13   http://www.phrmg.org/monitor1999/nov99-written.htm , accessed 23.04.09
14    Ibid.
15   http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03613675.htm, accessed 25.02.2009
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2.1 Discourse and social constructionism
The field of discourse analysis covers a range of different approaches and the term discourse 
itself is used in various ways within these approaches. Several definitions have been offered  
for the term, but for the purpose of this thesis I will concentrate on the one that is proposed by  
Vivien Burr in her book An Introduction to Social Constructionism (1995:48), which states 
that a discourse “refers to a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories,  
statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events. It refers  
to a particular picture that is painted of an event (or person or class of persons), a particular  
way of representing it or them in a certain light”. Language has a major role in creating this  
particular representation of the world, and even though discourse analytical approaches may  
vary a lot concerning methods of research and the goals for the research, they are based on the  
social constructionist way of looking upon language as not only reflecting reality to us  
neutrally, but as also being part of constructing that reality. This view is based on the idea that  
reality is only accessible to us through language, and that we, through language, create  
representations of reality (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:8-9). Following this view, the physical  
world gains meaning for us and becomes available to us through our way of talking about and  
understanding it through language and thus, following the definition above, through discourse.  
Having gained meaning for us through discourse, we as human beings are able to act in  
accordance with the representation, and our actions will then vary according to through which  
discourse the meaning has been constructed, i.e. the discourse that was regarded as ‘common-
sense’ or ‘truthful’ for us at that given time. Since our actions according to this view are based  
on the meaning given to us through discourse, discourse becomes a constructive part of the  
social world and thus, of reality. Implicit in the definition cited above is that a given discourse  
represents only one way of talking about and understanding the world, and that several  
different discourses will be available to represent an event in a another way. Burr (1995:48)  
outlines this: “[s]urrounding any one object, event, person etc., there may be a variety of  
different discourses, each with a different story to tell about the object in question, a different  
way of representing it to the world”. This means that there are at the same time several  
different ways of talking about the world. What we call knowledge about the world is always  
derived from looking at the world from a particular perspective, a perspective that serve some  
interests rather than others (Burr 2003:6). Such interests may include the political interests of  
different groups in a society, as will be the main focus of this thesis. 
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2.2 Language and power
If one accepts the social constructionist view that language does not only have the function of  
reflecting neutrally the world, but also of in fact creating and changing that world, the link  
between discourse and power becomes obvious. Being able to make one’s own ideas and  
beliefs the basis for the way the world is represented and perceived through discourse in  
society, will lead to a strengthening of one’s power in that society. This means that power  
struggles are also discursive struggles. Discourse functions ideologically by being the vehicle  
of what Norman Fairclough in his book Language and Power (2001:27) calls ideological  
power, which he defines as “the power to project one’s practices as universal and ‘common  
sense’”. Ideology in this sense is to be seen as knowledge deployed in the service of power,  
used by relatively powerful groups in society to sustain their position (Burr 1995:82).  
According to Fairclough (2001:28), there are two ways to exercise and sustain power in a  
society, through coercion or through consent. The two will in most cases be combined in one  
form or another, but it is mainly the aspect of power exercised through consent that is of  
interest to us here, being linked as it is to ideology and to discourses as bearers of ideological  
power. He also claims that in modern society, the exercise of power on the hands of one or  
another group is increasingly achieved through the ideological workings of language, and that  
language “has become perhaps the primary medium of social control and power” (ibid.:2).  
The study of language therefore needs to be a major part of social studies which seek to  
explore the relationships of power within a society. At the same time, the study of language  
cannot be separated from studies of the sociocultural context.
The French philosopher Michel Foucalt has had a major influence on the field of discourse  
analysis and the perception of power as related to discourse. For him, to exercise power is to  
define the world or a person in a way that allows you to do the things you want, because  
through defining or representing something in a particular way, we produce a particular  
‘knowledge’ (Burr 1995:64). Following this line, power is something productive that creates a  
type of knowledge, rather than a form of possession to be used for repressive means. Foucalt  
claims that the use of repression, or “rule by coercion” in Fairclough’s terms, is in fact  
evidence of lack of power, and will only be used when the limits of power have been reached  
(ibid.:65). As mentioned, Fairclough will claim that rulers in a society will also resort to the  
use of some kind of rule by coercion, but that rule by consent is the most effective and most  
used in a modern society. By establishing their ideas and beliefs as common-sensual and the  
‘truth’, and thereby defining the world, power holders will legitimatise and sustain their rule.  
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Power then, becomes an effect of discourse, but discourses will also always be challenged by  
other discourses which again will serve other groups in the society. 
Relating the notion of rule through coercion or consent to the Palestinian context, exercise of  
power through coercion is very much present, referring to the build up of a strong security and  
military apparatus by both Fata  and am!s in order to guard the interests of its own! "  
organisation and undermine the influence of the other. At the same time, it is obvious that both  
factions also put a great deal of effort into the aspect of exercising and legitimising their  
power through consent, for example by building up and controlling media institutions which  
serve to convey their ideological stand.
2.3 Power and media
Assuming that power in a society is closely linked to how the world is represented through  
language and discourse, the news media is undoubtedly one of the most influential channels  
when it comes to conveying certain representations of the world to a large number of people.  
People all over the world rely on newspapers and other media to give them a presentation of  
what happens in the world around them on an everyday basis, and news accounts for a  
significant part of peoples’ daily involvement in discourse. Despite the fact that journalists and  
editors of newspapers tend to claim that they report on events in a neutral and objective  
manner, we find when comparing different newspapers, that there is a significant difference  
when it comes to how events are presented. 
We have now assumed that language and discourse do not neutrally reflect the world, but  
rather contribute to the social construction of reality and to the establishment and sustaining of  
power relations. Since news are always carried through language, they are not a neutral  
reflection of the world, but contribute to the social construction of reality and affect the power  
relations in society. Roger Fowler gives the following definition of news in his book  
Language in the News (1991:4):
News is a representation of the world in language; because language is a semiotic  
code, it imposes a structure of values, social and economic in origin, on whatever is  
represented; and so inevitably news, like every discourse, constructively patterns that  
of which it speaks. News is a representation in this sense of construction; it is not a  
value-free reflection of ‘facts’.
By giving a certain representation of events and persons in its articles, a newspaper has made  
a choice from several different possible ways of representing the same. Following the view on  
the ideological power of discourse that we discussed above, Fowler claims that the choices the  
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newspapers make concerning linguistic expressions when reporting are not random and  
accidental, but made for a reason, carrying ideological distinctions (ibid.). It might seem from  
this that the news media within the same context are likely to report on the same events, and  
that the difference between them are mainly to be found in the way these events are presented.  
This is, however, not the case, as different newspapers will also differ from one another with  
regard to which events are in fact reported on, based on political, social and economic factors  
and interests related to the respective papers (ibid.:11). Representation in the media then is a  
constructive practice, but Fowler insists that it is not for each and every journalist to freely  
choose the way in which he presents his story. Newspapers are socially, economically and  
politically situated, and this leads all news to be reported from some particular angle  
(ibid.:10). A thorough study of news discourse must therefore include an examination of the  
social, economical and political context in addition to detailed text analysis. 
2.4 Consensus values
Rule by consent involves that the power holders are able to create a consensual “we” feeling  
among the population. According to Fowler (ibid.:51), the media plays a major part in  
constructing this consensual feeling by citing so-called consensus values in their reports.  
These are values that intended readers will agree upon and view as positive and legitimate,  
and which will have their opposites in negative, illegitimate values that are linked to a certain  
“them” group. Such a “we” group typically refers to a national grouping, but it can also refer  
to groups in moral or social terms. In the latter sense, it refers to a group within a society that  
lives by and agrees upon one set of norms and is consequently challenged by a “them” group  
which is perceived as a threat (ibid.). 
Fowler (ibid.:52) refers to a an extensive list of such positive, legitimate values and their  
negative opposites originally presented by Steve Chibnall (1977). In the present study relating  
to the Palestinian situation, I will draw the attention to some of the values included in this list,  
namely those which I expect to be referred to by the two newspapers of this study in their bid  
to help legitimise the rule of either Fata  or am!s:! "
o Legality vs. illegality
o Order vs. chaos
o Peacefulness vs. violence
o Honesty vs. corruption
o Responsibility vs. irresponsibility
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o Firmness vs. weakness
I expect that both parties will seek to create an impression that their rule will involve the  
positive legitimising values in the left column of the list, while the rule of the other party will  
be based on the opposite negative, delegitimising values in the right column of the list. My  
hypothesis is that references to these values will be found in the lexical choices of the  
newspapers in their reports on events related to the power struggle. 
Ideological meaning is, however, not only embedded in the lexicon of news texts, but also in  
grammatical features. A linguistic method for uncovering such covert ideological elements of  
a text is therefore necessary, and this constitutes a major part of the methodological framework  
of Critical Discourse Analysis, which is outlined below.
2.5 Critical Discourse Analysis
In the social constructionist view on discourse and language, it is assumed that language is a  
constructive part of social reality, and not merely a vehicle for a neutral and value-free  
reflection of a reality outside of language. Discourse and language carry with them ideological  
effects, which are clearly linked to the power relations in a society. This is a view that all  
approaches to discourse analysis share in their theoretical framework. These ideological  
effects will often be encoded in the language of, for example, newspaper articles through the  
choice of lexicon and syntax. Thorough linguistic analysis is therefore a tool to uncover these  
hidden ideological meanings of texts, but this is not sufficient for a complete discourse  
analysis. The social, economical and political context will also have a major effect on the  
discourses presented, and a theory and method that combines detailed text analysis with  
studies of the sociocultural context is therefore needed. This is what the approaches of Critical  
Discourse Analysis (CDA) seek to provide (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:60). CDA emerged in  
the late 1980’s and has since become one of the most influential branches within the broader  
field of discourse analysis (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000:447). Several different approaches  
have since then been developed under the umbrella of CDA that may vary significantly in  
their outlook, but according to Jørgensen & Phillips (2002:61) there are at least five common  
features that can be identified in all of them:
o They view discursive practices in everyday life as important forms of social practice  
which contribute to the constitution of the social world. Social and cultural  
reproduction takes partly place through discursive practices.
o Discourse is viewed as a social practice which not only constitutes the social world,  
but also is constituted by other social practices. It reflects social structures as well as  
contributes to shaping and reshaping them. The media discourse does for example  
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contribute to shaping forms of politics, but is at the same time influenced by societal  
forces, such as the political system, the economic system and the structure of the media  
institution.
o CDA engages in systematic, empirical studies of language use within its social context.
o Discourses are considered to have ideological effects. Discursive practices are closely  
linked to the power relations in society, and contribute to create and reproduce them.
o CDA is critical in the sense that it seeks to uncover the role of discursive practice  
concerning the creation and reproduction of the, often unequal, power relations in  
society.
Many regard Norman Fairclough as having developed the most comprehensive theory and  
method within CDA for the analysis of discourse as social practice (ibid.:64). Fairclough has  
his background in linguistics and detailed text analysis is the basis of his approach. His  
argument, however, is that text analysis is not sufficient, because, as we have seen, language  
and discourse is equally constituted by other social practices and contributes to shaping them.  
A combination of textual and social analysis is therefore required for discourse analysis, and  
in his approach he seeks to unite detailed textual analysis, macro-sociological analysis of  
social practice and micro-sociological interpretation in order to gain the full picture of the  
workings of discourse (ibid.:65). In order to achieve this, he has developed an analytical  
framework based on the idea that every instance of language use consists of three dimensions.  
It is at the same time a text, a discursive practice and a social practice (ibid.:68). All these  
three dimensions should be covered in a critical discourse analysis, focusing on (1) the  
linguistic features of the text, (2) processes related to the production and consumption of the  
text and (3) the wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs (ibid.). 
In the present study, the three dimensions are covered in order to give a complete analysis. In  
1.4, the general media situation in Palestine were presented, while each of the two papers  
history and position were outlined in 1.5 and 1.6. Combined, these cover the production  
process of the texts. In 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, the history of Fata  and am!s and the political! "  
situation in Palestine, including the history of the power struggle between the two groups, is  
outlined, covering the social practice part of the model. The main focus of the thesis will,  
however, be on the text analysis, which is at the core of Fairclough’s model, covered in  
chapter 3.
The detailed textual analysis in CDA is based primarily on the tradition of critical linguistics,  
which was developed in the 1970’s (O’Halloran 2003:14). According to one of the most  
influential developers of the approach, Roger Fowler (1991:67), critical linguistics “seeks, by  
studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and historical  
situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and value which are  
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encoded in language”. Critical linguistics assume that certain areas of language are more  
implicated in coding such ideas and beliefs than others, and by identifying and analysing  
these, one will be able to ‘decode’ the text (ibid.). Analysis of both the syntax and the  
vocabulary are important to critical linguistics in order to uncover a text’s ideological  
perspective when reporting on events. 
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A key concept when it comes to displaying ideological meaning in text is transitivity.  
Transitivity in critical linguistics is concerned with how events are presented related to the  
type of process that has taken place, and to the role of the participants in the event concerning  
this process. Fowler (ibid.:71) defines it in this way: “[t]ransitivity is the foundation of  
representation: it is the way the clause is used to analyse events and situations as being of  
certain types”. The aspect of transitivity leaves many choices for the author of a text, and the  
choices made may have significant implications on the ideological meaning of the text.
There are three main elements in transitivity, namely predicates, participants and 
circumstances. In my analysis of transitivity in the newspaper texts, I will make use of the  
terminology used by Fowler (ibid.:73-76) for the various kinds of these three elements, and I  
will give a short introduction to these terms here. 
Predicates is what designates the event or state of affairs described by the clause, and two  
different types of predicates are actions and  processes. An action is a deliberate activity under 
the control of agent(s) while a process is an event or activity which is neither deliberate or  
controlled. Actions and processes can again be either material, mental or verbal according to  
the situation. 
The participants are mainly divided into either agents, the doers of an action, and affected  
participants, the people and objects that have things done or happen to them. Affected  
participants are then divided into objects, where someone or something is affected in a 
material way by an action or process, and patients, who are human  (or at least animate) and 
has something done to them. In addition, the term force is used to describe something 
inanimate which causes an effect on someone or something, but that due to not being  
something conscious cannot be termed agent.  Circumstances are simply the description of the 
time and place of the event that has taken place. 
Fowler (ibid.:77) uses the term transformations  to refer to types of syntactic variations that 
will have a certain impact on the ideological meaning of a text. Two types of such  
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transformations are mentioned as the most significant in critical linguistics, namely  
passivisation and nominalisation. Passivisation of a sentence will basically mean that the  
focus is shifted from the agent to the affected by placing the affected in the syntactic subject  
position of the sentence. This move also opens for the agent to be completely omitted from the  
sentence, leaving the responsibility for the action(s) of the event unspecified and open for  
speculation. The role of the agent is thus blurred or mystified, while in an active sentence the  
agent is placed in the subject position and is clearly given the responsibility for the action(s).  
Nominalisation means that wider descriptions of events through the use of verbs and possible  
adjacent adjectives are substituted with a single noun. The effect of nominalisation will be, as  
with passivisation, that the agent(s) can be removed from the sentence. The action is made  
into a “thing”, something that happened without any clear responsibility on the hands of any  
agent. Readers will of course have an underlying knowledge which tells them that there has to  
be one or more agents responsible for what took place, but since this is blurred by  
passivisations and nominalisations, it will demand a lot more conscious thinking on behalf of  
the reader in order to put together the whole picture (Bergström & Bronéus 2005:285). 
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The ideological perspective of a text is not only to be found in its syntactic structure, but also  
in the lexical structure, the vocabulary chosen for the representation. Different words may  
have different connotations and be associated with positive, negative or neutral values by  
readers. In 2.3 we introduced the concept of consensus values that are generally cited by the  
media in order to legitimate the rule of certain groups in a society. It is assumed that the  
choice of vocabulary will be closely linked to these values, as words which correspond with  
the positive legitimate values will be linked to the “we” group, while words that will give  
associations to the negative, illegitimate values will be linked to the “them” group. 
In the following analysis, I will examine both the syntax and the vocabulary in the framework  
outlined here in order to uncover how the two newspapers carry ideological meaning in their  
news reports. 
2.6 Data and analytical approach
In my analysis, I have chosen to focus on three significant events in the internal strife between  
Fata  and am!s from May and June 2007, and how the two newspapers report on these! "  
events respectively in their “hard news” coverage. The texts chosen will be the newspapers’  
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main stories on each of the events, taken from the front page. Both newspapers offer a  
complete archive of full-text pdf versions of each paper issued on their website, and I have  
downloaded the copies used for this thesis from these archives. I have chosen to look at news  
articles rather than for example editorials or comments, because news articles will most often  
be presented as being neutral, while editorials and comments are expected to carry the more  
subjective attitude of the newspaper or the writer. The particular events are chosen because  
they each represent dramatic changes in the political and social conditions, and I expect that  
these changes will  be reflected in the  linguistic choices of the two newspapers. The events I  
have chosen to look at are:
o The Outbreak of fighting in Gaza on 13 May 2007, with 5 persons killed, among them  
a prominent Al-Aq ! Martyrs’ Brigades leader and a journalist of & Filas "n" . This 
represented the first serious fighting between the two parties after the signing of the  
Mecca agreement and the establishment of a national unity government, taking place  
in a period when both parties officially focused on national unity.
o The fighting in Gaza on 11 June 2007, which clearly showed that the conflict had  
escalated into a full-scale civil war.
o The seizure of the security headquarters in the Gaza Strip by am!s on 14 June 2007,"  
and the subsequent decisions taken by President Abb!s to dissolve the national unity"  
government and declare a state of emergency in the Palestinian territories. 
The linguistic features I will look at in the texts are:
! Transitivity: The choices made regarding the three elements of transitivity, including  
use of transformations, and the ideological effect this brings to the texts. 
! Lexicon: How the lexical choices of the two papers carry ideological meaning and  
serve to link the two parties Fata  and am!s to positive legitimising values or! "  
opposite negative, delegitimising values.
The texts are ordered chronologically according to the events on which they report, starting  
with the text from al-Hay!t al-jad"da. I begin each paragraph with a short introduction to the  
background of the event. Since the topic of this thesis is how different presentations of events  
can serve different interests, I find it necessary to point out that the introduction to each event  
is my own narrative based on my background knowledge obtained from several sources. I go  
on to analyse the texts related to each event. After giving a content summary of the text, I  
examine the analytical points outlined above and provide examples from the text. The findings  
linked to each event are then compared and discussed. 
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3. Analysis
3.1 Mid- May 2007 fighting
On 13 May 2007, the most serious fighting between Fata  and am!s supporters since the! "  
signing of the Mecca agreement on 8 February 2007 and the subsequent establishment of the  
national unity government, took place in the Gaza Strip. There had been incidents of violence  
in the days prior to this, but the newspapers had not reported much on it. The events of this  
day, however, left several people dead and injured, and they were covered in the main story of  
both the newspapers the following day. Among those killed was a leader of the Al-Aq !&  
Martyrs’ Brigades, Bah!! Ab" Jar!d, and a journalist from the Filas "n"  newspaper. 
Al- ay!t al-jad"da!  covered the the events in one extensive article on its front page (Text A),  
while Filas "n"  covered them in four shorter articles. For analytical purposes, I will treat the  
four texts as one, but for references, I have numbered them B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4 to match the  
numbering in the appendix. Two main themes are covered in these texts: the fighting which  
lead to the killing of five people and injuries to several more, and the efforts made by the  
Fata  and am!s leadership to resolve the situation and uphold their obligations towards the! "  
Mecca agreement. 
3.1.1 Text A –  Al- ay!t al-Jad"da 14 May 2007"
Text A was the main story on the front page of al- ay!t al-jad#da on 14 May 2007, and has the"  
following headline:
   ! :GIJK =BCADLFMN OP QARCSTE8 UVWXE )EWYZ8 U[C\    
The civil strife awakens: 5 killed and tens injured and kidnapped in Gaza
It has two sub-headlines:
 ]Z 1EWP^E8 QI[_TE `Ia8 (bCC\^E !bcdE U[Z =eWJf =RaEGg 0bHACK hCP8 2biV 
]eMjCITE
am!s and Fata  agree, with Egyptian mediation, to stop the fighting and withdraw the" !  
gunmen and free the detainees  
and
  =AakTE -ElVmE bebIn Qg QR_[P FleWo ]f OAIp8 qHPEWf8 "UJ\mE !Elcr" ]f lsb\ 
Leader of “the Al-Aq ! Martyrs” and his companion, and a journalist from the newspaper&  
Filas "n"  among the victims of the regrettable events
Three themes are covered in Text A:
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1) The renewal of the fighting in the Gaza Strip and its tragic result. Eyewitnesses describe  
heavy shooting between members of Fata  and am!s (line 32-38) and medical sources! "  
confirm (line 1-18) that five people were killed and more than 20 were injured in what is  
called the regrettable internal fighting  (=AakTE =t[uElDE )bvbwCr^E). 
2) That the two parties Fata  and am!s had reached an agreement, through Egyptian! "  
mediation, to immediately end the fighting, withdraw the gunmen and free the detainees.  
Much focus is in these parts of the text on the two parties' efforts to resolve the situation and  
to uphold the obligations of the Mecca agreement. A joint office ($WCYTE `CxTE) have been 
activated in order to supervise and follow up the agreement on the ground, and President  
Abb!s and Prime Minister Haniyya conducted a telephone call during which they discussed"  
the situation (line 26-30). 
3) The killing of the Al-Aq ! Martyrs’ Brigades leader Ab" Jar!d and mutual accusations&  
from Fata  and am!s. The Fata  spokesman! " !  Abd " al- ak#m " Aw" # gives am!s the full"  
responsibility for the murder, describing it as an attack on the national unity and the Mecca  
agreement, and calling it a severe violation of the agreement (=xf ;bAK^ EWtRu E.8by) (line 43-
48). am!s spokesmen on their side express their deep concern and surprise over the " rapid 
manner of the events which led to Ab" Jar!d’s death, and kidnappings, shooting and targeting  
of am!s- members’ houses undertaken by Fata  members. am!s further confirms its" ! "  
obligation towards the signed agreements with Fata , calling upon the interior minister to!  
investigate the events, assuring that the movement had no connection to the killing (line 49-
54). Two other Palestinian factions, Islamic Jihad and the S!m# al-Gh"l Brigades, are also  
given space to express their reaction to the renewed fighting (line 132-145) with the former  
calling on Fata  and am!s to show self-control, in order for the enemies of Palestine people! "  
to not get possibilities from the fighting. The latter, which is affiliated with Fata , on their part!  
condemn the criminal act of the murder of Ab" Jar!d and his companion, stating that the  
executors of this crime are scum (=DbzV) who work together with the occupation, striving for  
internal fighting and battle.        
3.1.1.1 Transitivity and transformations
Regarding transitivity in Text A, there is a clear difference between the parts of the text which  
deal with the negative and violent aspects of the incidents, such as the killings, injuries and  
kidnappings, and the parts which deal with the more positive aspects of how the two sides  
Fata  and am!s apparently worked to resolve the situation and end the fighting.  ! "
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(1)  :GIJK =BCADELFWN OP QARCSTE UVWXE )EWYZ8 U[C\  
(headline)
The civil strife awakens: 5 killed and tens injured and kidnapped in Gaza
 
(2)  {UD| FMN /bR\ OP =AakTE =t[uElDE )bvbwCr^E bebIn =[tJV /bAK*E =tnbTE =[t[DE =twRDE *"bJf )lv  
j *bd ;}~| -"EGV OP bIeWo ]eWYZ ]f Wzv{8 U[C\ =_iu
(line 1-6)
Medical sources confirmed last night the increase of amount of victims of the regrettable  
domestic  clashes  in  the  Gaza  Strip,  to  five  killed  and  more  than  twenty  injured  in  
incidents of shooting
 (3) .:bSr^E  )EWYZ [ir 2biV8 hCP OCvWV Qg =D"bwCf Ru )bt[iZ UDE 4? WKGCDE !EGoE )"E82  
(line 12-15)
This  atmosphere  of  tension  lead  to  mutual  actions  of  kidnappings  between  the  two  
movements Fata  and am!s which included tens of people.! "
Examples (1), (2) and (3) are all related to the negative aspects of the incidents, and show  
similarity in the choices made regarding transitivity. The most striking feature is how the  
predicates are presented as being processes and not actions, meaning that they are seemingly 
not under the control of any specific agent(s). In (1), the civil strife awakens  (GIJK =BCADE) is 
presented as the process that leads to the result of killed and kidnapped, and thus has the role  
of force in the sentence. The responsibility for what took place remains unspecified, made  
possible by the use of nominalisation, five killed and tens injured and kidnapped 
( LQARCSTE8 UVWXE )EWYZ8 U[C\ ), to describe the result. 
Similar nominalisations are also used in (2) with the result that the responsible agents are  
omitted from the sentence. The only verb left in the sentence is confirmed ()lv{) which 
describes the verbal action undertaken by the medical sources, and which is not linked to any  
violent actions. 
In (3), Fata  and am!s are mentioned in connection to the kidnappings, but still not as the! "  
responsible agents with this tense atmosphere ( 4? WKGCDE !EGoE) instead filling the role as the 
force which created this result. 
(4) ]eMjCITE ]Z 1EWP^E8 QI[_TE `Ia8 (bCC\^E !bcdE U[Z =eWJf =RaEGg 0bHACK hCP8 2biV  
(sub-headline 1)
am!s and Fata  agree, by Egyptian mediation, to stop the fighting and withdraw the" !  
gunmen and free the detainees
(5) qD}u bzIg =tB tZbiaE !E*.GDE ts*8 2bwZ "GiIf tsWDE Qg fE !b_f OAKb (bJKE Wo 0bv8 
.=xf ;bAKE U[Z +bAE8 bcsEGCVE %Go8 U[Z E"lr8 =AakTE -ElVmE)  
(line 29-30)
A telephone  call  took  place  between  President  Ma m"d  Abb!s  and  Prime  Minister! "  
Ism! #l Haniyya, during which they discussed the regrettable events and emphasised the"  
necessity of containing them and upholding the Mecca agreement.
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(6) !lwDE U[Z qwJBf ]f qCDbHCaE [Z <?DE OiaEGHDE Odb =t[uElDE We.8 f AKE =tB 0E fE ][ZE8 
.8lwe bf U[Z WKGCDE tCP /Md OP =tBf^E =RE twRCD =tsEWo^E )EGRE  OP” “2
(line 35-37)
It  was  announced yesterday  that  Haniyya  had  agreed  with  Interior  Minister  H!n#  al-
Qaw!sm#, who suspended his resignation from office, to start “the operational steps” in  
the application of the security plan, apparently defusing the tension.  
In contrast to the manner in which the violent aspects are reported, (4), (5) and (6) show how  
the text presents predicates related to the efforts by the leadership of Fata  and am!s to! "  
resolve the conflict mainly as actions, meaning that there is an active and responsible agent  
behind what took place. Fata! and am!s are the agents in (4) who actively " agree (0bHACK) to 
stop the fighting, withdraw the gunmen and release the detainees. In (5), the President and the  
Prime Minister fill the same role, as they during the telephone call discussed (bzIg) the events 
and emphasised (E"lr) the need to contain them and of upholding the Mecca agreement. In  
these two examples, both parties are equally portrayed as showing responsibility, while in (6),  
it is Prime Minister Haniyya who is the agent behind the positive action of agreeing to start  
the operational steps (=tsEWo^E )EGRE) to implement the security plan. 
We see here a tendency that al- ay!t al-jad"da!  in its reports on the events is careful not to 
directly blame any party or group for what took place, and rather focuses on the positive  
efforts undertaken by the authorities. The readers will of course have a knowledge that Fata! 
and am!s were involved in the fighting, but instead of pointing to their direct involvement in"  
violent actions in its own reports, the paper refers to statements made by the two parties and  
groups affiliated to them, in which they accuse each other for being involved in such actions.  
In this way, the text presents them as being agents behind different verbal actions aimed at  
hurting the other side, but not as directly responsible for material actions, which would have  
been more dramatic. Below are two examples of such statements, in which the most direct  
accusations come from Fata -affiliated groups aimed at am!s:! "
(7) OCDE (btCN^E =t[iZ ]Z =[fbxDE =tD8k_TE 2biV =vWV #GZ txE lwZ bcH~bd 0b_D U[Z hCP =vWV [iV8 
.=xf ;bAKE8 =tB~GDE FlVGDE 7lcC_K bcdbg bcCAp82
(line 43-45)
And the Fata  movement, through its spokesman ! !Abd al- ak#m " !Iwa#, gave the am!s"  
movement  the  full  responsibility  for  the  murder,  which  it  described  as  targeting  the  
national unity and the Mecca agreement.
(8) =tD8k_f =e?tABCDE (FGHDE)8 ,b_HDbg Ui_e bT =[fbxDE =tD8k_TE  0btg O\ UJ\^E !Elcr `sbCv [iV biv“  
"qHtPEWf lVE8 "EWo GgE !bcg lsbHDE 9^E (btCNE<
(line 69-70)
Likewise did the al-Aq ! Martyrs’ Brigades in statement give “the full responsibility for&  
the murder of the brother, the leader Bah (! Ab* Jar!d and one of his companions”
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The action undertaken by the Fata  movement and the ! al-Aq ! Martyrs’ Brigades&  here is to 
verbally give am!s the full responsibility (" [...] (btCN^E =[fbxDE =tD8k_TE [iV) for the killing of 
Ab" Jar!d in (8). In addition, the Fata  spokesperson in (7) also ! described (bcCAp8) it as 
targeting the national unity and the Mecca agreement. 
3.1.1.2 Lexicon
The lexicon used by al- ay!t al-jad"da ! in the coverage of the events reflects the newspaper's  
apparent interest in presenting the violence in a neutral manner and not to blame specific  
groups, while at the same time focusing on the national unity and agreement. The vocabulary  
used to denote the violent aspects is therefore one that gives the reader the impression that  
what took place is negative, but that no deliberate violations are committed by specific agents.  
If anything, a mutual responsibility is indicated: 
(9)   =BCADE (headline) 'the civil strife'
(10)  =AakTE -ElVmE (headline, line 27 and 30) 'the regrettable events'
(11)  =AakTE =t[uElDE )bvbwCr^E (line 3) 'the regrettable domestic clashes' 
(12)   )bvbwCrE/)bvbwCr^E (line 7, 32, 38, 58 and 59) 'the clashes/clashes'
(13)   =D"bwCf Ru )bt[iZ (line 13) 'mutual acts of kidnapping'
(14)   qZGd ]f (8mE -"bE (line 34) 'the first incident of its kind'
The few times agents are mentioned in connection with violent actions, the wordings chosen  
do not place the responsibility with a certain group or party: 
(15)   Qiz[TE (line 31) 'the masked'
(16)  2biV =vWV U[Z =gG_If Wu E WpbBZ8 hCP =vWV U[Z =gG_If WpbBZ (line  33)  'elements 
accountable  to  the  Fata  movement!  and  other  elements  accountable  to  the  am!s"  
movement' 
In the parts of the text that are concerned with the efforts to resolve the conflict, a vocabulary  
which focuses on joint efforts and agreement creates an impression of strong national unity  
and a functioning and responsible government: 
(17)   $WCYTE `CxTE (line 26) 'the joint office'
(18)   ;bAK^E ?tABK (line 26) 'implementation of the agreement'
(19)   =tdGdbHDE )E!EWo^E &bSKE (line 27-28) 'take legal steps'
(20)   =xf ;bAKE U[Z +bAE (line 30) 'protecting the Mecca agreement'
(21)   \GTE ;bAK^bg bcfEMCDE 2biV )lvE8 (line 52) ' am!s stressed its obligation to the signed"  
agreement'
(22)   =vWCYTE )bt[iDE (line 104) 'the joint efforts'
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The tendency to use a vocabulary which presents the violence in a neutral way regarding  
responsibility and rather focus on positive efforts is contrasted by the parts of the text which  
contain statements by the different groups, and which include mutual accusations. The  
majority of the accusations are in Text A from the Fata -affiliated al-Aq ! Brigades and the! &  
S!m# al-Gh"l Brigades directed at am!s, concerning the killing of the al-Aq ! leader Ab"" &  
Jar!d, and the lexicon used to denote the incident presents it as a deliberate illegal action:
(23)   (btCNE (line 43, 60 and 70) 'murder'
(24)   (btCN^E =t[iZ (line 44 and  46) 'the act of murder' 
(25)    =WXE (line 74) 'the crime'
(26)   (btCN^E =WXE (line 142) 'the crime of murder'
(27)   =tfEWoE =t[iDE (line 143) 'the criminal act'
The responsible for these actions are also denoted by a vocabulary with strong negative  
connotations: 
(28)   QfWjTE (line 73) 'the criminals'
(29)  (}CV^E f Q~EGCTE ]f =DbzV (line 144) 'scum among those who collaborate with the  
occupation'
(30)   !}iDE (line 147) 'the agents'
8"$"!%Text B – Filas "n 14 May 2007#
Filas "n"  covered the events of the previous day in four articles on its front page on 14 May  
2007. It should be noted that the paper on this day had added a front page dedicated to the  
deceased journalist of the newspaper in addition to the regular front page, which appeared on  
page three. 
Text B-1 has the headline:
  =gbp|8 QB~EGf =_iu CHf15=I[_f WpbBZ :bpWg ]eWu  
 Five civilians killed and 15 others injured by the bullets of armed elements
The text is divided into three main parts. The first part (line 1-37) gives an account of the  
fighting that took place. The paper states that the al-Aq ! Martyrs Brigades leader Ab" Jar!d&  
was killed by splinters from a rocket propelled grenade fired by unknown gunmen 
(0GDGcjf 0GI[_f), but adds that Fata  accused the am!s movement for the killing. In a! "  
statement, Fata  gives am!s the full responsibility for the killing, while the Izz al-D#n al-! " "
Qass!m Brigades on their part deny any connection to the incident and blame Fata  for trying!  
to cause a flare-up in tensions and demolish the air of calm and agreement in order to realise a  
foreign agenda. 
42
The second part (line 37-76) is devoted to statements from am!s, most of which are taken"  
from an interview with the movement's representative to the Joint Office ( $WCYTE `CxTE), Ayman 
aha. The main message in these statements is that am!s had no connection to the killing of+ "  
Ab" Jar!d, and that there are groups which work to put fire to the situation again and to return  
to the previous fighting in order to implement a certain agenda. No specific groups are  
mentioned in this regard, but Fata  is accused of of randomly throwing accusations and of!  
wanting to convey the message that it does not want any collaboration in the implementation  
of the new security plan. am!s further confirms it obligation towards the signed agreement"  
with Fata , assuring that it will not be driven into suspicious attempts aimed at setting ablaze!  
the interior Palestinian scene and poisoning the atmosphere of agreement, the national unity  
and the national Palestinian peace. 
The final part of the text (line 77-115) elaborates on the events that took place the previous  
day, including the spread of gunmen across the Gaza Strip, setting up of checkpoints and  
kidnappings. Most of this part appears to be the newspaper's own reports, but a statement from  
am!s is also referred to in which Fata  is accused of kidnapping the dean of the Islamic" !  
University in Gaza.    
Text B-2 has the headline: 
 FMg =AakTE -ElVmE eGRK 0bzIwe =tB8 2bwZ 
Abb!s and Haniyya discuss the confinement of the regrettable events in Gaza"
It deals mainly with two events: 
1) The telephone call between President Abb!s and Prime Minister Haniyya. The text states"  
(line 1-7) that a call took place between the President and the Prime Minister and that the two  
during it discussed the regrettable events and the work to confine them as soon as possible,  
stressing the need for self-control.
Two more phone calls are also said to have taken place (line 10-16), one with the Saudi  
foreign minister and one with the leader of the Egyptian security delegation in Gaza, in which  
all affirmed the necessity of stopping the bloodshed and to proceed to the language of dialogue  
and to put the Palestinian national interest first. 
2) The appeal from the legislative council to stop the fighting. The last part of the text (line 
17-31) deals with an appeal from the Legislative Council (OeWYCDE [jTE) to all the Palestinian 
factions and forces, and especially Fata  and am!s, to urgently stop the violence and! "  
destruction that take place in the Gaza Strip, and condemn the killings. The Council also calls  
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on the Palestinian media to work with a national spirit (=tB~8 58Wg) and to pursue accuracy 
when publishing information and news. 
Text B-3 has the headline:
 /*EGYDE ]f QI[_TE `Ia8 *bBDE ;}~| \8 U[Z 0bHACK 2biV8 hCP 
Fata  and am!s agree to end the shooting and withdraw the gunmen from the streets! "
The text reports on the agreement that was reached between Fata  and am!s in order to! "  
resolve the situation and is very similar in its content to the parts of Text A which dealt with  
the same topic (cf. 3.1.1). It is stated that the agreement on a cease fire and withdrawal of the  
gunmen was reached during a meeting the night before (line 1-5), while the last part (line 6-
20) refers to a statement published by the two movements in which more details on what was  
agreed are given.  
Text B-4 has the headline:
OYDE 0bit[a QR_[P =AtIJg *WITE "*bg ,lg ,lK =tBf{ WpbBZ
 Elements of the security executes the editor of the Filas #n newspaper in cold blood$
The text is entirely focused on the incident in which the journalist Sulaym!n al - A" sh# was 
killed and his colleague Mu am! mad A" bd" was injured.
The newspaper in this text goes far in accusing groups affiliated with Fata  for what happened!  
by stating that elements of the security apparatus committed the crime of executing al- A" sh#, 
claiming that he was targeted after he and his colleague were kidnapped on the morning of the  
previous day by members of the Presidential Guard, when they were in a taxi close to the  
house of President Abb!s  (line 1-12)."
The last part of the text reports that eyewitnesses added that members of the security apparatus  
seized the two men and a third person, and fired shots at them, leading to serious injuries  
before leaving them, bleeding (line 41-45).
3.1.2.1 Transitivity and transformations 
The choices regarding transitivity in Filas "n" 's reports are mainly similar to those of  al- ay!t!  
al-jad"da in Text A, with the same division between the parts dealing with the violence and the  
parts dealing with the efforts to resolve the conflict: 
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(31)  OYDE 0bit[a =tfGtDE QR_[P  =AtIp OP OAIJDE cBtg ]f QB~EGf =_iu f{ C\” “"23"]fbZ  
=I[_TE )bvbwCr^E "ly W| FMN /bR\ ]f =\WACf ~bBf OP =A[CSf 5EWjg 08Wu FWYZ =_iu `tp{8 
 2biV 8 hCP  OCvWV Qg ("bwCTE RE )bt[iZ8” ” ” “0 
 (B-1, line 1-5)
Five civilians, among them the journalist from the daily newspaper “Filas #n” Sulaym!n$  
al-!Ash#, 23 years old, were killed yesterday, and 15 others suffered different injuries in  
various  areas  of  the  Gaza  Strip,  after  the  renewal  of  the  armed  clashes  and  mutual  
kidnappings between the two movements Fata  and am!s ! "
(32) OP 2biV8 hCP OCvWV Qg )bvbwCr^E =[tJV 0|  :qD heWJK OP UGNWwDE UARJf." ,}ZE We.8 (b\8“  
8 U[C\ =_iu [g f{ FMN. bIeWo ”E
 (B-1, line 8-11) 
The information minister dr. Mu af! al-Bargh"th# said in a statement: ”that the result of&$  
the clashes between the two movements Fata  and am!s yesterday reached five killed! "  
and 14 injured.
In (31), the focus is on the affected participants of the fighting, the killed and injured, rather  
than on the agents responsible for it. The use of passives were killed (C\) and suffered injuries 
( […] 5EWjg `tp{) allows for the agent to be omitted from the sentence, and together with the use  
of the nominalisation renewal of the the armed clashes and mutual kidnappings  
(("bwCTE RE )bt[iZ8 =I[_TE )bvbwCr^E "ly), the events are presented as processes which are not  
controlled by any specific agent. The mentioning towards the end that the events took place  
between Fata  and am!s has more the function of circumstances in the sentence and does! "  
not place agency directly with either of them. The two movements are also mentioned in (32),  
but again they are not given agency for the killed and injured, which is presented as a process. 
(33) ) "EWo Gg{ !bcg CHf ]f )bZba lg )bvbwCr^E \88(bir UJ\mE !Elcr `sbCv *"EGv lV{ (bfbZ  
 bc[HC_e 0bv OCDE F*bt_DE U[Z 0GDGcjf 0GI[_f bcH[~{ =tu8*bp =Ae?\ bebYg qCgbp| W| FMN /bR\<
 (B-1, line 12-16)
The clashes took place hours after the killing o f Bah(  Ab! " Jar!d (23 years old), one of  
the  leaders  of  the  Al-Aq !  Martyrs’ Brigades  in  Northern  Gaza,  after  he  was  hit  by&  
splinters from a rocket-propelled grenade fired by unknown gunmen at the car which he  
was riding
(34) tV =Beli[D =_tsWDE ;WRDE ;}N|8 MoEGE )EWYZ =fb\|8 QI[_i[D bAzxf E*bYCdE FMN /bR\ lcr8 
) U[Z leMe bf MoEGE [K U[Z 0GI[_TE RCuE(.QB~EGTE8 )bfbXE =w[~ ]f cCtwDbN bB~Gf E 
 (B-1, line 78-82)
The Gaza Strip witnessed a dense spreading of gunmen and the setting up of tens of  
checkpoints and the closure of the main roads of the city, whereas the gunmen at those  
checkpoints  kidnapped  more  than  70  citizens,  most  of  whom  were  students  of  the  
universities and civilians.
The event which led to the killing of Ab" Jar!d is in (33) presented as an action, but we still  
find that the newspaper does not blame any specific group by referring to the agents behind  
this action as unknown gunmen (0GDGcjf 0GI[_f). Similarly, the anonymous the gunmen 
(0GI[_TE) fill the role as agents of the action kidnapped (RCuE) in the last part of (34). The first 
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part of (34), however, follows the line of presenting the events as processes by using the  
nominalisations a dense spreading of gunmen ( EOI[_i[D bAzxf E*bYCd ) and setting up of tens of  
checkpoints ( E )EWYZ =fb\|MoEG ), instead of using active clauses like gunmen spread 
(0GI[_f WYCdE) or gunmen set up (0GI[_f ,b\{). 
Filas "n" 's coverage also contains several references to statements in which the two parties  
verbally accuse each other of being responsible for negative actions. However, in contrast to  
Text A, the majority of these accusations are directed at Fata  by am!s or am!s-affiliated! " "  
groups, the only exception being (35):
(35)  tiXE hB :Db\8 ""EWo Gg{ CHf ]Z =tD8k_TE fbv" bcD 0btg OP "2biV" =vWV "hCP" =vWV [iV8”  
 Flf ."=WXE 4? EGwxK*E ]e?DE8 QfWjTE =HV}T =wabBTE )E!EWoE &bSK^ =Zba 2
(B-1, line 22-26)
The Fata  movement gave in a statement the am!s movement “the full responsibility for! "  
the killing of Ab" Jar!d”, and said: “we grant the public 48 hours to take the suitable steps  
in order to prosecute the criminals who committed this crime”.
(36) (btCN^E =t[ig bcC\}Z qtP Ad bdbtg 2biV  =vW =gbCDE ,b_HDE ]elDE MZ `sbCv )*lp{ b*8lg” “  
FlBo{8 =tJSr %*¡f tHICD ;bAK^E8 !8lcDE !EGo{ ¢eGHK8 WKGCDE !bv&  =D8bIf hCP )bfbcKE )WwCZE8“  
 . =to*bu”)  
(B-1, line 27-31)
On their  part,  the  Izz al-" D#n al-Qass!m Brigades,  which belongs to  am!s,  issued a"  
statement in which it denied its connection to the murder, and considered the accusations  
of Fata  to be an attempt “to cause a flare-up in the tension and to demolish the air of!  
calm and agreement in order to realise special goals and a foreign agenda.
(37) #WK <?DE FMg =tf}aE =fbXbg WnbITE eWYDE O[Z." cBZ 1EWPE £ ]e?DE QARCSTE .Wg{ ]f8 
 .bcD 0btg OP 2biV  )Wv& bf `_V hCP =vW =gbK WpbBZ ]f qCdb|8 qARu £8 !ElCZ^ qDMBf” “)
 (B-1, line 83-87)
Among the most prominent kidnapped who was released was dr. A" l# al-Shar#f, the dean 
of the Islamic university in Gaza, whose house was attacked, and who was kidnapped and  
insulted by members belonging to the Fata  movement, according to what am!s said in! "  
a statement.
The Fata  movement in (35) verbally ! gave ([iV) the am!s movement the responsibility for"  
the killing, while the Izz al-D#n al-Qass!m Brigades " considered ()WwCZE) the accusations to be 
an attempt at causing a flare-up in (36). The two parties are thus presented as being  
responsible for verbal actions aimed at hurting the other party, but not of actual material  
actions. The same kind of modification is found also in (37) in which the last part, according  
to what am!s said in a statement ! (bcD 0btg OP "2biV" )Wv& bf `_V), shows that this is not the 
newspaper's own report, and as such it cannot confirm that the action actually took place.
One part of Filas "n" 's report breaks with the above pattern, however, namely the report on the  
killing of the journalist al- Ash#. Here"  the Fata -affiliated security apparatus is openly blamed!  
for the killing without any modifications: 
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(38) {"*bg ,lg OYDE tVWDE lwZ 0bit[a QR_[P =AtIJg *WITE ,ElZ| =Wo %bxK*E U[Z =tBf{ WpbBZ fl\  
.FWtRu 58Wjg qCgbpE UDE "{ bf 8lwZ liIf <*E"^E ¤GTE qybg *bBDE ;}~E82
(B-4, line 1-6)
Elements of the security undertook the perpetration of the crime of execution of the editor  
of the Filas #n newspaper, Sulaym!n$  Abd al-Ra!)m al- Ash), in" "  cold blood and of firing 
shots  at  the  administrative  employee,  Mu ammad  Abd",  which  led  to  him  being! "  
seriously injured.
(39) 5bwp 8lwZ q[tf.8 qPbRCubg =absWDE 2W =gbK =tBf{ WpbBZ fb\ 0{ lg OYDE tfMDE lcYCaE l\8 
.2bwZ "GiIf tsWDE (MBf %W\ FWo{ F*bt_D Q[HC_f bdbv biBtV f{) 
 (B-4, line 7-12)
The  colleague  al- Ash#  was  martyred  after  elements  of  the  security  " belonging  to  the 
Presidential Guard kidnapped him and his colleague Abd" yesterday morning, when they"  
were boarding a taxi close to the house of President Ma m"d Abb!s.! "
The killing of al- Ash# is in (38) and (39) presented as an action with a clear agent. In (38) this"  
agent is elements of the security ( WpbBZ=tBf{ ), while in (39) it is further specified as elements of  
the security belonging to the Presidential Guard ( =absWDE 2W =gbK =tBf{ WpbBZ), both of which 
refer to the Fata -controlled security apparatus. The newspaper does not make any efforts to!  
conceal the responsibility, and it is interesting to note that these two examples are not taken  
from parts of the text which refers to statements from one of the two parties or neutral  
witnesses, but is presented as the newspaper's own report on the incident.   
The positive efforts that took place to resolve the conflict are also in Filas "n " presented mainly 
as actions with both parties being given the role as active agents:
(40) FMg =AakTE -ElVmE eGRK 0bzIwe =tB8 2bwZ 
(B-2, headline)
Ab" b!s and Haniyya discuss the confinement of the regrettable events in Gaza
(41)  =AakTE -ElVmE eGRK8 ABDE ¥wn %Go8 U[Z 0bPWRDE )lv{8 
(B-2, line 6-7)
The two parties emphasised the obligation of self-control and enclosing of the regrettable  
events
(42)  /*EGYDE ]f QI[_TE `Ia8 *bBDE ;}~| \8 U[Z 0bHACK 2biV8 hCP
 (B-3, headline)
Fata  and am!s agree to end the shooting and withdraw the gunmen from the streets! "
(43) =fbZ )btx[f ]f 4.bjCVE £ bf v8 QPWRDE ]f QARCSTE =Pbv ]Z <*GADE 1EWPE U[Z b¦e{ 0ElPGDE AKE8 
.("bCZ8 =I[a{) =pbu8) 
 (B-3, line 18-20)
The two delegations also agreed to the immediate release of all the kidnapped of the two  
parties, and of all belongings that has been confiscated, personal and public (weapons and  
ammunition).
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No transformations are used in these examples to conceal responsibility as the two parties and  
their respective leaders are presented as being the agents responsible for the actions discuss 
(0bzIwe) in (40), emphasised ()lv{) in (41) and  agree (0bHACK)/agreed (AKE) in (42) and (43). 
3.1.2.2 Lexicon
The lexicon of Filas "n " in its coverage of the events does not differ much from that of al-
ay!t al-jad"da ! in Text A. In its reports on the violence, a vocabulary which neutralises the  
responsibility is used, both when denoting the events: 
(44)   =I[_TE )bvbwCr^E (B-1: line 4) 'the armed clashes'
(45)   ("bwCTE RE )bt[iZ (B-1: line 4) 'mutual actions of kidnapping'
(46)   =AakTE -ElVmE (B-1: line 6, B-2: headline, line 3-4 and 7) 'the regrettable events'
(47)   )bvbwCr^E (B-1: line 9, 12 and 20) 'the clashes'
(48)   `eWSCDE8 BDE (biZ{ (B-2: line 21-22) 'acts of violence and destruction'
(49)   FWtRE -ElVmE (B-3: line 6) 'the serious events'
and the agents: 
(50)   0GDGcjf 0GI[_f (B-1: line 15) 'unknown gunmen'
(51)   0GVb_TE /QI[_TE (B-1: line 18, 55, 80, 103 and 115) 'the gunmen'
(52)   QDGcjf (B-1: line 96) 'unknown'
When referring to the positive efforts undertaken by the two parties and the government in  
relation to the events, also Filas "n " uses a lexicon that refer to national unity and agreement: 
(53)   \GTE ;bAK^bg bcfEMCDE U[Z 2biV )lvE8 (B-1: line 62) ' am!s confirmed its obligation to"  
the signed agreement'
(54)   *EGE =D (B-2: line 15) 'language of dialogue'
(55)   =tB~GDE =I[Jf (B-2: line 15-16) 'national interest'
(56)   =tB~8 58Wg (B-2: line 30) 'with national spirit'
(57)   =tB~GDE =I[JTE U[Z bpWV (B-3: line 10) 'protecting the national interest'
(58)   $WCYTE `CxTE (B-3: line 22) 'joint office'
Like in Text A, the image of unity and agreement is modified by a more negatively loaded  
vocabulary found in the statements by the different parties. In Filas "n" , however, the majority 
of the statements are from am!s and the al-Qass!m Brigades in which they deny the"  
accusations from Fata  concerning the killing of Ab" Jar!d, and at the same time accuse Fata! ! 
of actions which disrupt the unity and agreement:  
(59)   ;bAK^E8 !8lcDE !EGo{ ¢eGHK  (B1: line 30) 'demolition of the atmosphere of peace and  
agreement' 
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(60)   =to*bu FlBo{8 =tJSr %*¡ f tHICD  (B1: line 30-31) 'to realise special goals and a  
foreign agenda' 
(61)   bPEMo cCDE !bHD| (B1: line 44) 'randomly throwing charges'  
(62)     =t[uElDE =tBtR_[ADE =Vb_DE WtjAK (B1: line 65) 'blasting the Palestinian domestic field'  
(63)   =tBtR_[ADE O[mE [_DE8 =tB~GDE FlVGDE8 ;bPGDE !EGo{ ti_K (B1: line 66-67) 'poisoning the 
atmosphere of national unity and national Palestinian peace' 
As already mentioned, Filas "n" 's report on the killing of the journalist al- Ash# is distinctively"  
different from the rest of the coverage. The lexicon in this part, which appears to be the  
newspaper's own report, portrays the incident as a serious violation: 
(64)   "*bg ,lg ,lK (B-4: headline) 'execute in cold blood'
(65)   […] "*bg ,lg ,ElZ| =Wo (B-4: line 2-4) 'crime of execution […] in cold blood'
(66)   lcYCaE (B-4: line 7) 'was martyred' 
The responsibility for the killing is put on the Fata -controlled security apparatus:!
(67)   =tBf{ WpbBZ (B-4: headline, line 1 and 41) 'elements of the security'
(68)   =absWDE 2W =gbK =tBf{ WpbBZ (B-4: line 8-9) 'elements of the security belonging to the  
Presidential Guards'
8"$"8%9:33('/%21%.;5%72-5'(<5%21%.;5%3+0=>(/%!??@%A<;,)<
The fighting in the Gaza Strip on 13 May 2007 took place only some three months after the  
signing of the Mecca agreement which called for national unity and the language of dialogue,  
and the subsequent establishment of the unity government. The renewal of the fighting  
threatened to demolish the basis for this unity project which the two parties entered into after  
being subjected to heavy internal and external pressure, and the coverage of the fighting in  
both al- ay!t al-Jad"da!  and Filas "n"  appears to be aimed at conveying the message that the 
unity is still strong and that the unity government will survive and continue to work for the  
interests of the Palestinian people. 
Based on this, the two newspapers' representations of the events are to a large extend conform,  
and follow what can be called a national unity discourse . In the texts, efforts are apparently 
made to not blame any specific group or party for the violence that took place, but rather focus  
on the active role played by the government and the leaders of Fata  and am!s in order to! "  
resolve the conflict. This is illustrated by the difference in choices made regarding transitivity  
in the parts of the texts which cover the violence and the parts that cover the more positive  
aspects, such as the calls that took place between Abb!s and Haniyya and the agreement that"  
was reached between Fata  and am!s through Egyptian mediation. In the former we find an! "  
extensive use of transformations such as passives and nominalisations which moves the focus  
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from the agent(s) responsible for what took place, to the affected participants and the result.  
The negative sides of the events are thus mainly presented as processes which are neither  
deliberate nor controlled. In the latter, however, the opposite is the case. In these parts, the  
leaders and the unity government are more often presented as agents who are both active and  
responsible, and no efforts are made to blur the agency. This representation is dominant in  
both papers and helps create the impression that a strong national unity still exists in the  
Palestinian territories and that the legitimacy of the unity government and the Mecca  
agreement are not affected by the renewed fighting. 
The lexical choices in the texts largely support the impression of a national unity discourse.  
The negative aspects of violence are described through the use of a vocabulary which does not  
put the blame on any specific agent but rather points to a mutual responsibility. By modifying  
the two parties' direct involvement in the violence, their legitimacy and the legitimacy of the  
unity government is upheld. 
In the reports on the efforts undertaken by the two parties and the government to resolve the  
conflict, however, a vocabulary with positive connotations is used by both newspapers.  
Referring to Chibnall's list of consensus values (cf. 2.4), this vocabulary corresponds with  
several of the positive legitimising values (the number in brackets refers to the example in  
which the lexicon occurs): 
Lexicon Values
$WCYTE `CxTE  'the joint office' (17), (58) Peacefulness, responsibility
;bAK^E ?tABK 'implementation of the agreement' (18) Responsibility, order
=tdGdbHDE )E!EWo^E &bSKE 'take legal steps' (19) Legality, responsibility, firmness
=xf ;bAKE U[Z +bAE 'protection of the Mecca 
agreement' (20)
Responsibility, order
$WCYTE )bt[iDE 'the joint efforts' (22) Peacefulness, responsibility
*EGE =D 'language of dialogue' (54) Peacefulness
=tB~GDE =I[Jf 'national interest' (55) Responsibility
=tB~8 58Wg 'with national spirit' (56) Honesty, responsibility
=tB~GDE =I[JTE U[Z bpWV 'protecting the national  
interest' (57) 
Responsibility, firmness
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Through linking both parties equally to a vocabulary which correspond with positive  
legitimising values, the newspapers contribute to building consensus for unity and agreement,  
and not for one specific side of the conflict. 
Despite the main impression from the reports on the fighting being that the newspapers try to  
follow the line of what I have called a national unity discourse, the underlying conflict  
between Fata  and am!s appears in parts of the text, particularly in the statements made by! "  
the two movements and affiliated groups. While being careful not to directly blame any  
specific group for violence in their own accounts of what took place, both papers allow the  
parties to accuse each other of being responsible for violence, including killings and  
kidnappings. 
The lexicon used in these statements is also significantly different from that used in the  
newspapers' own reports. The violence is described by a vocabulary with strong negative  
connotations, presenting it mainly as deliberate violations committed by responsible agents. In  
al- ay!t al-jad"da! , the accusations are mainly concerned with the killing of one of the leaders  
of the al-Aq ! Martyrs Brigade, Ab" Jar!d, and in most of these, am!s or its affiliated& "  
groups are mentioned explicitly as the agent, while in others it is implicit from the context that  
they are the ones who are blamed. When analysing the negatively loaded vocabulary in these  
accusations, we find that they correspond with several of the negative, delegitimising values  
of Chibnall's list:
Lexicon Values
(btCN^E =WXE/(btCNE =t[iZ/(btCNE 'murder'/'the act of 
murder'/'the crime of murder' (23), (24), (26)
Illegality, violence
=tfEWoE =t[iDE/= WXE 'the crime'/'the criminal act'  
(25), (27)
Illegality
Filas "n"  on its part has only one reference to the accusations from Fata  in its report, and!  
focuses instead on statements from am!s in which the movement distances itself from any"  
involvement in the killing and accuse Fata  of trying to destroy the unity and agreement. The!  
lexicon in these accusations also correspond with negative, delegitimising values on Chibnall's  
list:
Lexicon Values
;bAK^E8 !8lcDE !EGo{ ¢eGHK 'demolition of the 
atmosphere of peace and agreement' (59)
Irresponsibility, chaos
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=to*bu FlBo{8 =tJSr %*¡f tHICD 'to realise special 
goals and a foreign agenda' (60)
Corruption
bPEMo cCDE !bHD| 'randomly throwing charges' (61) Corruption, irresponsibility
=t[uElDE =tBtR_[ADE =Vb_DE WtjAK 'blasting the 
Palestinian domestic field' (62)
Chaos, violence
=tBtR_[ADE O[mE [_DE8 =tB~GDE FlVGDE8 ;bPGDE !EGo{ ti_K 
'poisoning the atmosphere of national unity and  
national Palestinian peace' (63)
Corruption, chaos
The fact that it is clearly stated that these are statements presented by the two parties, and not  
the newspapers' own accounts of the events, however, helps modify the effect of these  
accusations, but by comparing which statements that are included in the respective  
newspapers and the content of the accusations in these statements, we do not only get an  
indication of the two papers political affiliations, but also of some of the core elements of the  
conflict. am!s is mainly linked to the negative, illegitimate values " illegality and violence in 
the accusations from Fata , while Fata  on their part is mainly linked to ! ! corruption and 
irresponsibility in the accusations from am!s. Looking at the historical and political context,"  
this is not surprising as am!s has traditionally been regarded as having taken over the role of"  
leading the armed resistance against Israel from Fata , and as such been deemed an illegal!  
terrorist organisation by many countries. At the same time, Fata  has been criticised by am!s! "  
for being corrupt and for letting the down the Palestinian cause through its focus on  
diplomatic solutions. By including these statements, al- ay!t al-jad"da!  and Filas "n"  
contribute, although in an indirect manner, to each party's attempts at delegitimising the other  
party, showing that the national unity discourse which prevail in other parts of the coverage is  
fragile. 
A further indication of the underlying conflict is the report on the killing of the journalist al-
Ash# in " Filas "n" , in which the Fata -controlled security apparatus is openly blamed for his!  
death in the newspaper's own reports. This part breaks with the style of the rest of the  
coverage, and a possible explanation for this is the direct involvement of the newspaper in the  
incident as it was one of their own journalists who was killed, and that the report therefore is  
coloured by the emotions of the author(s) at the time of writing.
3.2 The 11 June 2007 fighting in Gaza
On 11 June 2007 the heaviest fighting since the January 2006 elections broke out in the Gaza  
Strip between troops loyal to am!s and Fata . It seemed clear that the unity government was" !  
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not going to last, and that a full-scale civil war was in the making. International media  
reported that “fighting has taken on a new intensity and brutality in recent days” 16, and the 
Egyptian mediator in Gaza was quoted, saying about the two rival parties that “[...] they have  
killed all hope. They have killed the future.” 17 Both al- ay!t al-jad"da ! and Filas "n " had the 
fighting as the main story on the front page the following day.
8"!"$%&56.%B%C%DE= (/F.%(E=G(0H0(%$!%I:)5%!??@"
Text C is taken from the front page of al- ayat al-! jad"da on 12 June 2007 and has the 
headline:
 §FMN OP UVWXE )EWYZ8 4}¨8 %{8 qHtHr8 <8bICP lsb\ cBtg }tC\  
19 killed, among them a Fata  leader and his brother and a father and his two sons, and tens!  
injured in Gaza
It also has two sub-headlines: 
!bw~mE =gbHd8 =IJDE 8 )btAYC_TE uE" UDE lC©8 =fGxE =_[o ¢AK )bvbwCr^E” ”  
(bCC\^E FWsE" ]f =tIJDE PEWTE 1EWu^ 0ElrbBK 
The clashes break up cabinet session and spread to inside the hospitals and the “health”, and  
the Medical Association plead for the health installations to be kept out of the sphere of  
fighting
and:
 /biCo}D QCvWE GZle "biV8 #WDE 2*lK 2biV8 *bBDE ;}~^ be*GP bA\8 5WCHK hCP 
/*bY[D !Gj[Dbg "lce8 ,GtDE  
Fata  proposes an immediate ceasefire and am!s considers the proposal, and am!d calls! " "  
the two movements to a meeting today and warns against resorting to the street
The main part of the text reports on the heavy fighting that took place in different areas of the  
Gaza Strip the previous day, and the result of this fighting, including 19 people being killed  
and tens injured. The fighting is reported to have spread to inside the hospitals in Gaza and to  
the surroundings of the cabinet headquarters, leading to the break up of an official  
governmental meeting. Several medical sources are quoted in the text giving details on the  
victims' names and injuries (line 42-54). 
The Fata  spokesperson Tawf#q Ab" Kh" a is quoted from a press conference in which he! &  
presented a proposal saying that Fata  is ready to bear the responsibility and have the courage!  
16   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6744713.stm , accessed 13.11.09
17   ibid.
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to initiate a unilateral cease fire. He further underlined his movement’s obligation to the  
Mecca agreement, which stipulates the end of armed display. In response to this, a am!s"  
spokesperson says that his movement is studying the proposal and that am!s is working to"  
end the tension (line 18-35).
In the last part of the text (line 86-110), the government's view on the situation is expressed,  
especially regarding the shooting towards the building where the cabinet was conducting its  
weekly meeting. The government assures in a statement that it will prosecute the responsible  
for what it calls serious violations (FWtRu )bADbSf), without naming any specific groups. An 
unnamed source at the Prime Minister's office says that the Prime Minister is following the  
events in order to return the situation back to normal. The deputy Prime Minister, al-A mad,!  
on his part accuses unnamed elements for not wanting an end to the fighting and for wishing  
to create conditions suitable to direct a decisive blow towards the agreements contained in the  
Mecca agreement.  
3.2.1.1 Transitivity and transformations
The choices made regarding transitivity in Text C follow mainly the line of the texts discussed  
in 3.1 covering the mid-May 2007 fighting, with a widespread use of transformations in the  
reports on the violence, which contribute to concealing the responsibility:
 (69)  C\§Qg FMN /bR\ OP WsElDE (bCK^E _[_f ]f =eGf" =H[V OP fE 58Wjg )EWYDE `tp{8 bB~EGf  
 .2biV8 hCP OCvWV%
(line 1-5)
19 citizens were killed and tens were injured yesterday in a new bloody sequence of the  
revolving series  of  fighting in the Gaza Strip between the two movements Fata  and!  
am!s."
(70)  FMN /bR\ OP )btAYC_TE uE"8 ¥tIf OP 2biV8 hCP *bJdE Qg fE DldE =AtBZ )bvbwCrE dbv8 
(line 57-59)
And violent clashes broke out yesterday between followers of Fata  and am!s around! "  
and inside the hospitals in the Gaza Strip
Fata  and am!s are mentioned as being involved in the incidents in both (69) and (70), but! "  
by using transformations, the newspaper is able to move the focus away from them as agents.  
In (69) the use of passives killed (C\) and injured (`tp{) instead makes the patients 19 citizens  
( §]~EGf ) in the beginning of the sentence the focal point, while the passive broke out (DldE) 
is used in (70) with the result that the events are presented as processes rather than actions.  
In Text A we saw how al- ay!t al-Jad"da!  presented predicates related to the efforts taken to  
resolve the conflict as actions, with the leaders of both Fata  and am!s as active agents. In! "  
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Text C such efforts are still presented as actions, but with the significant difference that this  
time Fata  is given agency alone:!
(71)   #WDE 2*lK 2biV8 *bBDE ;}~^ be*GP bA\8 5WCHK hCP2
(sub-headline 2)
Fata  proposes immediate ceasefire and am!s studies the proposal ! "
(72) .#WDE E? =elo lf 2*lK bcdE 2biV Db\ QV OP *bBDE ;}~^ be*GP bA\8 hCP =vWV VWC\E b*8lg
 (line 15-18)
On their part did the Fata  movement propose an immediate ceasefire, while am!s said! "  
that they were investigating the seriousness of that proposal.  
In both (71) and (72), Fata  is presented as the agent responsible for the verbal action!  
proposes immediate ceasefire (be*GP bA\8 5WCHK) and did propose an immediate ceasefire 
( […] be*GP bA\8 VWC\E), while am!s is given a more passive role. "  
While the reports on the mid-May fighting in both papers referred to several statements in  
which the two parties accused each other of being responsible for violent actions, Text C only  
contains one similar reference. Interestingly this refers to the Ham!s-affiliated al-Qass!m  
Brigades accusing members of Fata , saying that they ! executed (flZE) one of its field 
commanders:
(73)  QtdEltTE bcK"b\ lVE flZE hCP =vWV ]f WpbBZ 0E bcD 0btg OP ,b_HDE `sbCv Db\8
(line 70-71)
The al-Qass!m Brigades said in a statement that members of Fata  executed one of their!  
field commanders 
3.2.1.2 Lexicon 
The lexical choices in the parts of Text C that cover the violent aspects of the events are not  
significantly different from those found in al- ay!t al-jad"da! 's coverage of the mid-May 
fighting. A vocabulary which presents the violence as negative, but not as deliberate violations  
is still predominant, with the main difference being that in this text, more qualifying adjectives  
with negative connotations are added, indicating that the fighting had intensified:
(74)   )bvbwCr^E (headline and line 61) 'the clashes'
(75)  WsElDE (bCC\^E _[_f ]f Flelo =eGf" =H[V (line 3-4) 'new bloody sequence of the revolving  
fighting'
(76)   =AtBZ )bvbwCrE (line 49, 58 and 68) 'violent clashes'
(77)   =I[_TE )bvbwCr^E (line 53) 'the armed clashes'
(78)   =D"bwCf 7bRCuE )bt[iZ (line 56) 'mutual acts of kidnapping'
(79)   tBDE (bCC\^E (line 63-64) 'the violent fighting'
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The agents involved in the violence are presented by a neutral vocabulary which indicates  
mutual responsibility and which do not blame any specific group: 
(80)   hCP8 2biV ]f WpbBZ (line 53-54) 'elements from am!s and Fata '" !
(81)   2biV8 hCP *bJdE (line 58) 'adherents of Fata  and am!s'! "
(82)   2biV8 hCP ]f Q[KbHf (line 65) 'fighters from Fata  and am!s'! "
(83)   QI[_TE (line 75) 'the gunmen'
The only reference in the text to an accusation from one of the parties which contains a  
vocabulary indicating that the other party committed violations, is the accusation by the al-
Qass!m Brigades blaming Fata :!
(84)   flZE hCP =vWV ]f WpbBZ (line 70) 'elements from Fata  executed'!
In contrast to the report on the violence, we find differences regarding the lexical choices in  
the parts of the report concerned with the efforts to resolve the conflict. The vocabulary that 
linked both parties and the government to unity and agreement in the coverage of the mid-
May fighting is no longer present in this text, and instead Fata  alone is linked to a lexicon!  
referring to peace and agreement:
(85)   *bBDE ;}~^ be*GP bA\8 (headline, line 16 and 21-22) 'immediate ceasefire'
(86)    *bBDE ;}~E \Gg F*"bwi[D F{WXE (line 23-24) 'the courage to initiate a ceasefire'
(87)   […] =fWxTE =xf ;bAKbg ,EMCDE (line 29-30) 'obligation […] to the Mecca agreement'
8"!"!%&56.%J%C%K+E(* H)%$!%I:)5%!??@#
Text D is taken from the front page of Filas "n " on 12 June 2007 and has the headline: 
                                                   FMN OP OfElDE QB^E =[tJV bIeWo ]eWYZ8 U[C\ FWYZ
Ten killed and 20 injured as a result of the bloody Monday in Gaza
The first part of the text (line 1-48) focuses on the clashes that took place in the Gaza Strip the  
previous day and its results, stating that nine people were killed and more than 20 injured.  
Both medical sources and eyewitnesses are referred to in this part, and they state that it was  
gunmen affiliated with the Fata  movement that targeted many of the victims. !
A large part of the text (line 50-95) is dedicated to statements made by the am!s-affiliated"  
Executive Force (=e?tABCDE FGHDE) in which it announced that it called up all its members in order 
to work for the protection of the citizens and that they shall defend the Palestinian people will  
full strength. They also stress that the Executive Force is a part of the security establishment,  
working in accordance with the laws and regulations. The statements contain some serious  
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accusations towards Fata , saying that Fata  are coup makers and usurpers who implement the! !  
plans of the Zionist enemy (OdGtcJDE 8lDE) against the Palestinian people, and that have 
exercised a propaganda campaign against the Executive Force from the beginning, which also  
included direct attacks. 
Following the strong attacks from the Executive Force against Fata , a part of the text (line!  
97-110) is dedicated to the announcement from the Fata  movement regarding its readiness to!  
to declare a unilateral cease fire in order to end the internal fighting. am!s on their part"  
obligate themselves to retaliate the killing of the am! -affiliated imam Mu ammad Raf!t#," & !  
(who was killed on 10 June 200718), while at the same time declaring in a statement that they  
are not in a struggle with the Fata  movement for the power (line 111-125). !
3.2.2.1 Transitivity and transformations
The choices made regarding transitivity in Text D break with the line of using transformations  
to blur responsibility in reports on violence, which has been prevailing in the previous texts  
we have discussed from both Filas "n " and al- ay!t al-jad"da! . In this text, the violence is 
instead mainly presented as actions, with the Fata  movement and groups affiliated with it as!  
agents. 
(88)   =d*bAxDE abg ]~EGTE 0E 0GdbV tg UAYC_f OP =twRDE *"bJTE Db\8LFGHDE "EWP{ lV{ G8 ]fbZ  
.FMN /bR\ (bir hCP =vWV wCK =I[_f =ZGijf qCPlcCaE 0{ lg C\ =t[uElDE F*E.GD =gbCDE =e?tABCDE2  
(line 11-16)
The medical sources at the Beit an"n hospital said that the citizen B!sal al-Kaf!rnah, 25"  
years old and one of the members of the Executive Force which belongs to the Interior  
Ministry, was killed after an armed group belonging to the Fata  movement targeted him!  
north in the Gaza Strip.
(89)  ,b_HDE F"b\ lV{ (MBf U[Z *bBDE ;}~ªg EGfb\ hCP =vW 0GwCe QI[_f 0{ 0btZ "Gcr "bP{82
(line 22-24)
And eyewitnesses added that gunmen belonging to the Fata  movement fired shots at the!  
house of one of the leaders of al-Qass!m
(90)  ;}~ªg EGfb\ hCP =vWV U[Z QgG_ITE Wxg =[sbZ OI[_f ]f E"lZ 0{  :«~bYDE tSf OP 0btZ "Gcr (b\8“  
EGfb\8 =e?tABCDE FGHDE F"b\ lV{ *GjZ 0.bf ]~EGTE "bcYCaE UD| "{ b¬ tSTE OP *GjZ =[sbZ (MBf U[Z *bBDE 
 ."cD FWjBf OP *bBDE (brªg0  
(line 35-40)
Eyewitnesses in the al-Sh! i  refugee camp said: “that a number of gunmen from the Bakr$ !  
family, affiliated with the Fata  movement, fired shots at the house of the Aj"r family in! "  
18   http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=4165:bloody-fighting-in-gaza-on-the-first-day-of-the-
general-certificate-of-education-exams&catid=72:press-releases-security-chaos-&Itemid=213,  
accessed 29.07.10
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the camp, which led to the martyrdom/loss of life of the citizen M!zin Aj"r, one of the"  
leaders of the Executive Force, and put fire to a carpentry belonging to them”
In (88) focus is on the affected participant as a consequence of the use of the passive was 
killed (C\), but through the inclusion of the circumstances after an armed group belonging to  
the Fata  movement#  targeted him (hCP =vWV wCK =I[_f =ZGijf qCPlcCaE 0{ lg), Fata  is still!  
presented as the responsible agent. In (89) and (90) agency is even more clearly expressed as  
gunmen belonging to the Fata  movement#  (hCP =vW 0GwCe QI[_f) and gunmen from the Bakr  
family, affiliated with the Fata  movement#  (hCP =vWV U[Z QgG_ITE Wxg =[sbZ OI[_f) respectively, 
are presented as active agents who fired shots (*bBDE ;}~ªg EGfb\) and put fire to a carpentry 
(FWjBf OP *bBDE (brªg EGfb\). This representation of agency is similar to what we found in the  
mutual accusations referred to in Text A and Text B, however, with the significant difference  
that here the medical sources (=twRDE *"bJTE) and eyewitnesses (0btZ "Gcr), which are supposedly 
neutral, are behind the statements. In this way the newspaper gives the readers the impression  
that this is an unbiased and correct account of what took place. 
The only place where Filas "n"  uses transformations to blur responsibility is in the opening  
lines, as shown in (91), in which passives killed (C\) and injured (=gbp|) makes it possible for 
the author to omit the agent(s):
 (91)  EltJK )lcr OCDE =AakTE =eGflDE )bvbwCr^E OP f{ ]eWu ]eWYZ ]f Wzv{ =gbp|8 QB~EGf =_K C\
 FMN /bR\ ]f =\WACf ~bBf OP f{ Wc¤ lg EWtRu6
(line 1-4)
Nine  citizens  were  killed  and  more  than  20  others  were  injured  yesterday  in  the  
regrettable bloody clashes which witnessed a serious intensification yesterday afternoon  
in different areas of the Gaza Strip
There are no references to violent actions undertaken by am!s or its affiliated groups in the"  
text. The am!s-controlled Executive Force is rather presented as being responsible for"  
positive actions as a response to the violence of the Fata -affiliated groups: !
(92) tio !bZlCaE8 bcPGAp OP ,bDE *bABCa^E =DbV =t[uElDE F*E.GD =gbCDE =e?tABCDE FGHDE B[Z{ T& UD| 
bBwr !bBg{ ]Z FG\ xg PElCa8 <lemE =PGCxf HK ]D" bcd{ Flvkf QB~EGTE =ebiV o{ ]f i[D bWpbBZ 
 ."0­E lg x_K ]D8 D& [v bicf =e?tABCDE FGHDE U[Z #WIe 8{ <lCe ]f v V}Ca8)
(line 50-57)
Thereby,  the  Executive  Force,  belonging  to  the  Interior  Ministry,  declared  a  state  of  
general alert within its ranks and called up all of its members for duty in order to protect  
the citizens, stressing that they “will not stand idly by and shall protect our people with  
full force and prosecute all those who attack or provoke the Executive Force, whatever the  
cost, and they shall not be silent from now on”.
The am!s-controlled Executive Force in (92) declare that they " shall protect (PElCa) the 
people and prosecute (V}Ca) those who attack them. Focus is thus no longer on joint efforts  
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to resolve the conflict, which was portrayed in the texts covering the mid-May fighting, but  
rather on this group as taking responsibility on its own. 
Despite the focus on Fata  as the active part in the violence, the statement in which the!  
organisation announces it preparedness to enter an agreement in order to end the fighting is  
also referred to by Filas "n" :
 (93) (bCC\^E \GD ®OHtHV8 ,M[f8 "bo ;bAK^ b"ElCaE "hCP" =vWV B[Z{ f{ !b_f ]f Wu¯Cf \8 OP8 
 FMN /bR\ OP O[uElDE2
(line 97-99)
Fata  announced late last night its preparedness to enter a sincere, binding and genuine!  
agreement to stop the internal fighting in the Gaza Strip 
3.2.2.2 Lexicon
In the parts of Text D which appear to be Filas "n" 's own report, i.e. where no other source is 
mentioned, the lexicon used to denote the violent aspects of the events are similar to that used  
in the coverage of the mid-May fighting, meaning that it is presented as negative but with no  
specific group being blamed:  
(94)   =AakTE =eGflDE )bvbwCr^E (line 2) 'the regrettable bloody clashes'
(95)   )bvbwCr^E (line 27) 'the clashes'
(96)   =I[_f )bvbwCrE (line 34) 'armed clashes'
(97) "2biV" =tf}aE =f8bHTE =vWV ]f QI[_f8 hCP =vW =tDEGTE =tBfmE FMcomE ]f WpbBZE  (line 5-7) 
'elements from the security apparatus adherent to the Fata  movement, and gunmen from!  
the Islamic Resistance Movement “ am!s”'"
(98)   0GI[_TE (line 41) 'the gunmen'
(99)   QjolTE Qiz[TE QI[_TE ¢g (line 47) 'some of the masked and heavily armed gunmen'
Large parts of the text are, however, based on statements from different sources, and in these  
parts we find a vocabulary which presents the violence mainly as violations committed by  
Fata  or Fata -affiliated groups. It is significant that this is the case not only in statements! !  
from am!s-affiliated persons, but also from persons that appear to be neutral, including"  
medical sources and eyewitnesses:
(100)   qPlcCaE (line 14) 'targeted him'
(101)  […] *GjZ 0.b f ]~EG TE "bcYCaE UD | "{ b¬ *bBDE ;}~ª g EGfb \ (line 38) 'fired shots […] 
which led to the martyrdom/loss of life of the citizen M!zin Aj"r'"
(102)   =e?tABCDE FGHDE !bBg{ 7ElcCaE (line 90) 'targeting of members of the Executive Force'
(103)   *bBDE ;}~| =Wo (line 91) 'crime of shooting'
(104)   "*bg ,lg cfElZ| (line 95) 'their execution in cold blood'
In these statements, Fata  is openly blamed for being responsible for these negative actions:!
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(105)   hCP =vWV wCK =I[_f =ZGijf (line 15) 'group of gunmen belonging to the Fata! 
movement'
(106)    hCP =vW 0GwCe QI[_f (line 22-23) 'gunmen belonging to the Fata  movement'!
(107)  OdGtcJDE 8lDE )bRRSf 08?ABe ]e?DE hCP =vWV Otg}HdE (line 67) 'coup-makers from the  
Fata  movement who implement the plans of the Zionist enemy'!
(108)   hCP =vWV U[Z QgG_ITE Qg}Hd^E8 =dGE (line 89) 'the traitors and the coup-makers  
adherent to the Fata  movement'!
Statements by the am!s-controlled Executive Force is also given considerable space in the"  
text, containing a vocabulary which presents its actions in a positive manner, as opposed to  
those of Fata : !
(109)   PElBa/PElCa (line 54 and 70) 'shall protect'
(110)   V}Ca (line 55) 'shall prosecute'
(111)   0GdbHDE P8 iK (line 59) 'working according to the law'
(112)   =tBfmE =_akTE hsEGD bcRw¦K (line 60) 'regulated by the standing rules of the security  
establishment'
(113)  =tD8k_TE8 )bw¦d^E )bo*" U[Z{ (line 85-86) 'highest level of discipline and  
responsibility'
Fata  on its part is only referred to by a positive vocabulary regarding its willingness to enter!  
an agreement and to declare ceasefire: 
(114)   ,M[f8 "bo ;bAK^ b"ElCaE (line 98) 'its readiness to enter a sincere and binding  
agreement'
(115)   lVE8 `dbo ]f *bBDE ;}~| \8 ;bAKE 0}Z "ElCaE (line 104-105) 'readiness to declare a  
unilateral ceasefire' 
3.2.3 Summary of the coverage of the 11 June 2007 fighting 
The fighting on 11 June 2007 was the most serious of its kind in the Gaza Strip since the  
elections in January 2006, and the representation of the events in both al- ay!t al-jad"da ! and 
Filas "n " reflect the increased tension. In their coverage of the mid-May fighting discussed in  
3.1, the two newspapers both followed what I called a national unity discourse which  
apparently focused on creating the impression that unity and agreement was still valid  
regardless of the renewed clashes. Despite this discourse being prevailing, however, there  
were also indications of the papers' respective political affiliations, displayed mainly in the  
references to statements made by the two parties. These affiliations are more directly  
displayed in their coverage of the 11 June 2007 fighting, and the conformity in the two  
newspapers' representation is no longer present. Of the two, al- ay!t al-jad"da ! is the one 
which remains closest to a national unity discourse, while Filas "n " on its part clearly moves in 
the direction of a more conflict-orientated discourse. 
Different choices regarding transitivity, both in reports on the violent aspects of the conflict,  
and in reports on the efforts to resolve it, contribute to the diversified representation.  
60
Concerning the former, al- ay!t al-jad"da!  in its reports continue to make use of 
transformations such as passives in order to present the events as processes which are not  
under the control of specific agents. Filas "n " on its part, mainly presents the violence as  
deliberate actions undertaken by Fata -affiliated persons and directed against members of the!  
am!s-controlled Executive force and the al-Qass!m Brigades. This representation of the"  
violence is similar to what we found in the parts referring to statements made by the two  
parties in Text A and Text B concerning the mid-May fighting. A significant difference,  
however, is that in Text D we find this representation in statements made by eyewitnesses and  
medical sources who are supposedly neutral parts in the conflict, giving the reader the  
impression that this is an accurate account of what took place. The presentation in Filas "n"  of 
Fata  as the aggressive part not only serves to place this organisation in a bad light, but also to!  
create a sense of consensus for the actions undertaken by the am!s-controlled Executive"  
Force, which are presented as being a necessary response to the violent actions of Fata . !
While Filas "n " apparently aims at building consensus for am!s and the Executive Force by"  
focusing on Fata  as being responsible for violence, ! Al- ay!t al-jad"da ! on its part focuses on 
Fata 's role in the efforts undertaken to resolve the conflict. In its coverage of the mid-May!  
fighting, such efforts were presented as a joint venture involving both parties and the  
government. This time, however, am!s is not given an active role in this positive aspect of"  
the conflict as Fata  is presented as the sole agent behind actions aimed at ending the fighting.!  
These efforts by Fata  are also mentioned in ! Filas "n " (cf. example (93)), but the main focus in 
this paper is rather on the Executive Force's reaction to the Fata  aggression which include!  
promises to protect the Palestinian people whatever the cost (cf. example (92). 
The different choices in transitivity in the two newspapers' coverage contribute to two  
contradicting pictures being painted of the events and of each of the parties role in what took  
place. It is clear that building consensus for the national unity government and to express  
support for the Mecca agreement is no longer the main focus, and this impression is further  
strengthened when we look at the lexical choices in the reports, and how these link the two  
parties to either legitimising or delegitimising values. 
In its reports on the violence, the lexical choices of al- ay!t al-jad"da ! are mainly similar to 
those of its coverage of the mid-May fighting, meaning that it is presented as negative, but not  
as direct violations committed by specific agents. There are equally no statements included in  
the coverage in which any group is accused of committing violations, and based on this the  
vocabulary used does not link either of the two parties to negative, delegitimising values. 
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In Filas "n" 's reports, however, we find statements which include a vocabulary that clearly links  
Fata  to such values:!
Lexicon Values
[…] ]~EG TE "bcYCaE UD | "{ b¬ *bBDE ;}~ª g EGfb \ 
*GjZ 0.b f 'fired  shots  […] which  led  to  the  
martyrdom/loss  of  life  of  the  citizen  M!zin  
Aj"r' (101)"
Violence, illegality
=e?tABCDE FGHDE !bBg{ 7ElcCaE 'targeting members of 
the Executive Force' (102)
Violence, illegality
*bBDE ;}~| =Wo 'the crime of shooting' (103) Illegality, violence
"*b g ,l g cfElZ | 'their execution in cold blood'  
(104)
Illegality, violence
8lDE )bRRSf 08?ABe ]e?D E hCP =vWV Otg}HdE 
OdGtcJDE 'the  coup  makers  of  the  Fata! 
movement  who  implement  the  plans  of  the  
Zionist enemy' (107)
Corruption, illegality, chaos
hCP =vWV U[Z QgG_ITE Qg}Hd^E8 =dGE 'the traitors 
and  coup  makers  adherent  to  the  Fata! 
movement' (108)
Corruption, illegality, chaos
The linking of Fata  to corruption through accusing it of advocating foreign interests was!  
present also in the coverage of the mid-May fighting. The allegations take a more serious form  
in this text, however, as members of the movement are directly accused of collaborating with  
what is named the Zionist enemy, and of being traitors.  In addition, there is also a stronger  
focus on linking Fata  to the negative, delegitimising values of ! violence and illegality through 
presenting it as the aggressive part in the conflict. In contrast to this representation of Fata ,!  
Filas "n " also includes in its report statements by the am!s-controlled Executive Force in"  
which a vocabulary which mainly links it to positive legitimising values is used:  
Lexicon Values
PElCa 'shall protect' (109) Responsibility, order
V}Ca 'shall prosecute' (110) Responsibility, legality, firmness
0GdbHDE P8 iK 'working according to the law'  
(111)
Legality, honesty, order
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=tBfmE =_akTE hsEG D bcRw¦K 'regulated  by  the 
standing rules of the security establishment'  
(112)
Legality, honesty, order
=tD8k_TE8 )bw¦d^E )bo*" U[Z{ 'highest levels of 
discipline and responsibility' (113)
Responsibility, honesty, order
The aim of these statements is apparently to at one hand delegitimise Fata , and on the other!  
hand build consensus for am!s in general and for the Executive Force in particular. The"  
increased focus on the Executive Force can be explained by the intensification of the conflict  
which took place since the mid-May fighting. This Force was established in April 2006 by the  
am!s-led Interior Ministry as a response to President Abb!s' decision to transfer the control" "  
with the regular police force to the President's office (cf. 1.3). As the conflict intensified and a  
break-up of the unity government and the Mecca agreement seemed likely, the am!s"  
leadership probably realised the need of creating an impression of this force as a responsible  
and legitimate police force under the control of the Interior Ministry, and not as yet another  
armed group loosely connected to one of the sides in the conflict. This is done by opposing it  
to the violence and illegality of Fata  and its security forces, and by emphasising honesty,!  
responsibility and legality as core principles of the force. As an armed force, the Executive  
Force can be used as a tool for am!s to establish a rule by coercion (cf. 2.2), but the focus on"  
linking it to consensus values show that it is important for the movement to establish a rule  
based on consent. 
While Filas "n" 's reports contain statements  which link Fata  to negative, delegitimising values!  
and which focus on the positive aspects of the Executive Force, al- ay!t al-jad"da ! on its part 
focuses on Fata 's will and efforts to end the fighting, by referring to statements by the!  
movement with a vocabulary that links the movement to positive legitimising values:
Lexicon Values
*bBDE ;}~^ be*GP \8 'immediate ceasefire' (85) Responsibility, peacefulness
*bBDE ;}~E \Gg F*"bwi[D F{W XE 'the  courage  to 
initiate a ceasefire' (86)
Responsibility, peacefulness
… =fWxTE =xf ;bAKbg ,EMCD E 'obligation  …  to  the 
Mecca agreement' (87)
Responsibility, honesty
In these statements we find that Fata  is linked to the values ! responsibility, peacefulness and 
honesty. Focus is thus on presenting the movement as the responsible and strong part which  
can secure peace for the Palestinian people, in line with its historical background as the  
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advocate for a diplomatic approach. At the same time the impression of Fata  as the!  
aggressive part that was given in the statements, is contradicted. In the coverage of the mid-
May fighting, positive efforts to end the conflict were in al- ay!t al-jad"da ! linked equally to 
both parties and the government. The fact that it is only Fata  that is presented as being!  
involved in such efforts this time shows that the newspaper has taken a significant step away  
from the national unity discourse, although to a less extend than Filas "n" . 
3.3 The am!s seizure of the security headquarters in Gaza and the"  
dissolving of the unity government on 14 June 2007
After several of days of intense fighting between groups affiliated with Fata  and am!s! "  
respectively in the Gaza Strip, am!s and groups loyal to it seized control of the headquarters"  
of the different Fata -controlled security forces in the Gaza Strip on 14 June 2007. This led to!  
President Abb!s dissolving the unity government and declaring a state of emergency in the"  
Palestinian territories. An emergency government was put up by the President, headed by the  
former Finance Minister Sal!m Fay!d, while am!s on their side announced that they would"  
not accept this new government and continue to rule on their own. The dramatic developments  
dominated the front page of both the newspapers on 15 June 2007. Al- ay!t al-jad"da ! covered 
both the am!s takeover of the security headquarters and the response from President Abb!s" "  
in one article (Text E), while Filas "n"  had the same themes covered in three shorter separate  
articles. As in 3.1, I will treat these texts as one for analytical purposes, numbering them  F-1,  
F-2 and F-3 for reference. 
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Text E was the top story of the front page of al- ay!t al-jad"da ! on 15 June 2007 and has the 
headlines:
FMN8 =A¦DE OP °*EGRDE =DbV #WP ][e8 =fGxE tHe tsWDE 
The President dismisses the government and declares the imposing of state of emergency in  
the West Bank and Gaza
and: 
 CHf8 =absWDE lCBf bctP b± =tBfmE *bHTE U[Z WRt_K 2biV/bRHDbg bB~EGf  
am!s takes control of the headquarters of the security including the Presidential assembly"  
room and 27 citizens killed in the Gaza Strip
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The first part of the text (line 1-22) focuses on the decisions made by President Abb!s to"  
dismiss the current government, impose a state of emergency and form an emergency  
government after the latest security developments in Gaza. It is referred to statements from the  
Presidential General Secretary al- ayyib Abd al-Ra #m, who describes the developments that+ !"  
took place in Gaza as an attempt at a military coup against the Palestinian legislation and a  
violation of the basic law.
In response to the decisions taken by the President, am!s, through its spokesperson S!m#"  
Ab" Zahr#, says that the decisions made by the President to dismiss the government and to  
declare a state of emergency are unacceptable and do not have any practical value, claiming  
that according to the law, the current government should be transformed into a care taking  
government (line 23-29).
The last part of the text (line 30-48) is concerned with the events that took place the previous  
day. The newspaper states that at least 107 people have been killed during the last week's  
fighting, and that the spokesperson of the al-Qass!m Brigades announced that the group the  
night before took control over all the security headquarters of the Palestinian National  
Authority in the Gaza Strip, including the presidential assembly room. It is further reported  
that fighters from am!s seized the office of the security forces and that the am!s leaders" "  
announced the “liberation” of the Gaza Strip. Medical sources say that at least 24 people were  
killed, among them 18 from Fata  who were found in the headquarters of the Preventive!  
Security.  According to witnesses, masked gunmen from am!s evicted tens of Fata  fighters" !  
from the building, some of whom were undressed. The text ends with a reference to a  
statement from Ab" Zahr# in which he says that what takes place in Gaza is a second  
liberation of the Strip from the herds of agents (!}iDE 0bR\) after the liberation from the herds  
of settlers (QB~GC_TE 0bR\). 
3.3.1.1 Transitivity and transformations
The main focus of al- ay!t al-jad"da! 's coverage of the 14 June events is on the decisions 
taken by the President in response to the am!s offensive. The choices made regarding"  
transitivity in this part of the text help create an impression of the President as a strong leader  
by making him the active agent:    
(116)  FMN8 =A¦DE OP °*EGRDE =DbV #WP ][e8 =fGxE tHe tsWDE
(headline)
The President dismisses the government and declares the imposing of state of emergency  
in the West Bank and Gaza
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(117) =tDbE =fGxE =Db\E *W\ 2bwZ "GiIf tsWDE 0E fE !b_f =absW[D ,bDE Qf^E tVWDE lwZ `tRDE ][ZE 
.FMN /bR\ OP FWtu^E =tBf^E )E*GRCDE WE °*EGRDE =DbV #WP8 =tB tZbiaE  =absWg2  
(line 1-3)
The Presidential General Secretary, al- ayyib Abd al-Ra #m, declared yesterday evening+ !"  
that President Ma m"d Abb!s decided to dismiss the the current government headed by! "  
Ism! #l Haniyya and to impose state of emergency after the latest security developments in"  
the Gaza Strip.
(118) […] !E*.GDE ts* =Db\bg" bfGaWf *lpE 2bwZ tsWDE 0E tVWDE lwZ (b\8” 8
(line 8)
Abd al-Ra #m said that the President issued a decree “dismissing the prime minister […]”!"
(119) "°*EGRDE =DbV &bAdE =fGxV" txYCg O¦He bzDb bfGaWf *lpE tsWDE 0E 7bnE88 
(line 14-15)
And he added that the President issued a third decree calling for the formation of “a  
government for implementation of the state of emergency” 
The decisions made by Abb!s are in these examples presented as actions under the control of"  
him as the sole agent. He is the one who actively dismisses (tHe) and declares (][e) in (116), 
decided (*W\) in (117) and issued (*lpE) in (118) and (119). No transformations are used to  
modify or conceal the responsibility. 
The other aspect of the events, namely the takeover of the security headquarters, are also  
presented as actions in the text. This time, however, it is am!s and groups affiliated to it"  
which are given agency:  
 (120)   CHf8 =absWDE lCBf bctP b± =tBfmE *bHTE U[Z WRt_K 2biV/bRHDbg bB~EGf  
(sub-headline)
am!s  takes  control  of  the  headquarters  of  the  security  including  the  Presidential"  
assembly room and 27 citizens killed in the Gaza Strip
(121) bctP b± =tBfmE *bHTE tio U[Z 2biV =vWV O[KbHf !}tCaE8 FMN /bR\ OP /bn8mE *GlK lg D& !bo 
 .=absWDE WHf2
(line 4-5)
That came after the deterioration of the conditions in the Gaza Strip and the seizure by  
fighters  from  the  am!s  movement  of  all  the  security  headquarters,  including  the"  
Presidential headquarters.
(122) .FMN /bR\ "WeW²" GD8k_f ][Z{8 =tBfmE GHDE ijf U[Z fE 2biV G[KbHf UDGCaE 0bv88
(line 35-36)
Gunmen from am!s took over the building of the security forces and its responsible"  
declared “liberation” of the Gaza Strip.
   (123) UBwTE ]f q_g}f ]f c¦g "Wo hCP O[KbHf ]f )EWYZ 1EWubg 2biV ]f 0GBHf 0GI[_f ,b\8 
 ."GcYDE `_V !EGcDE OP celeE EGP* l\82
(line 45-46)
Masked gunmen from am!s evicted tens of Fata  fighters,  some of them undressed," !  
from the building and they raised their hands in the air, according to witnesses.
66
In the first part of (120), am!s is the agent which actively " takes control over the  
headquarters (*bHTE U[Z WRt_K). In the same sentence, the use of the passive  27 citizens killed 
(  CHfbB~EGf ) contributes to concealing the direct responsibility for these deaths, but since  
am!s is mentioned as the agent in the first part, the impression is that it is responsible also"  
for the killings. Nominalisation is used in (121) with seizure (!}tCaE), but here the agent 
fighters from the am!s movem! ent (2biV =vWV O[KbHf) is included, making it clear who is 
responsible. In (122) and (123), there are no elements that modify the responsibility for the  
actions, as gunmen from am!s ! (2biV G[KbHf) and masked gunmen from am!s !
(2biV ]f 0GBHf 0GI[_f) respectively functioning as agents. The mentioning of the patients  
tens of Fata  fighters # (hCP O[KbHf ]f )EWYZ) in (123) strengthens the impression that Fata  is the!  
victim in the events, while am!s is the aggressive agent. "
3.3.1.2 Lexicon
Most of Text E is based on statements from persons affiliated with either Fata  or am!s, and! "  
the lexical choices vary according to whose statements are referred to. The statements by the  
Presidential General Secretary Abd al-Ra #m, representing Fata , are given most space in the! !"  
text, and the vocabulary used in these parts presents the actions undertaken by am!s as"  
deliberate illegal actions:
(124)   =tfEWo^E %WE (line 11) 'the criminal war'
(125)   <Wx_DE %}Hd^E (line 12) 'the military coup'
(126)   h[_TE 0btJDE (line 12) 'the armed revolt'
(127)  =tBtR_[ADE =tZWYDE ln =eWx_Z =tg}HdE =D8bIf (line 20) 'attempted military coup against  
the Palestinian legislation'
(128)   Oaba^E 0GdbH[D hnE8 $bcCdE (line 20) 'clear violation against the Basic Law'
Statements from am!s and the al-Qass!m Brigades are not given the similar amount of space"  
in the text, but the lexicon used in these statements presents the same actions in a different  
manner, as something positive:
(129)   WeW² (line 36) 'liberation'
(130)  !}iDE 0bR\" ] f /bRH[D "0b  WeW²”8 " (line 47) 'second liberation of the (Gaza) Strip  
from herds of agents'
The decisions by the President are in these statements, however, denoted by a vocabulary with  
clear negative connotations: 
(131)   #GPWf (line 25 and 26) 'unacceptable'
(132)   =t[iZ =it\ Ud"E qD tD (line 25 and 28) 'it has not the least practical value'
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Text F-1 was the main story on the front page of Filas "n " 15 June 2007, and has the headline:
FMN /bR\ U[Z qC¦w\ xIe ,b_HDE
Al-Qass!m strengthens its grip on the Gaza Strip 
The first paragraph (line 1-9) of this short text states that fighters from am!s took control of"  
most of the security headquarters in Gaza the day before, after the surrender and flight 
(%8W8 ,}_CaE) of the members and commanders of the Palestinian security apparatus 
(=tBtR_[ADE =tBfmE FMcomE). The am!s spokesperson Ab" " Zahr# is quoted saying that am!s was"  
forced to this step after negotiations failed to stop what he calls the crimes of this group 
(=ADE 4? ]f sEWo), without specifying which group he points to. 
The second paragraph (line 10-14) is concerned with the international reactions to the events,  
with the UN General Secretary calling for talks regarding the deployment of an international  
force to the Gaza Strip, something which am!s is reported to reject. "
Text F-2 is also from the front page of Filas "n"  on 15 June 2007, next to Text H, and has the 
headline: 
°*EGRDE =DbV 0}Z|8 =fGxE V *WHe 2bwZ tsWDE
President  Abb!s  decides  on  dissolution  of  the  government  and  declaration  of  state  of"  
emergency
The text deals solely with the three decrees issued by President Abb!s in response to the"  
developments the day before. Except from line 15-16, the entire text consists of  statements  
made by the Presidential General Secretary al- ayyib Abd al-Ra #m  regarding these decrees.+ !"  
The statements referred to are almost identical with the statements referred to in line 1-22 of  
Text H (cf. 3.3.1). The text does not refer to any statements from other organisations or  
persons. 
Text F-3 was placed below the two previous texts on the front page of Filas "n " on 15 June 
2007 and has the headline:
"qD =t[iZ =it\ ^8 =nGPWf" 2bwZ )E*EW\ 0E WwCK 2biV2
am!s considers Abb!s' decisions to be unacceptable and without any practical value " "
The text is based on statements from three different persons who are all affiliated with am!s"  
regarding the decisions made by the President. 
In the first part (line 1-33) the spokesperson S!m# Ab" Zahr# says that he considers the  
decisions taken by President Abb!s to dismiss the government, declare a state of emergency"  
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and form transition government to be unacceptable and without any practical value. He states  
further that, according to the law, the current government transforms into a care-taking  
government and that there is no such thing in the law called state of emergency. He also  
discloses that contacts took place during the last two days between the am!s movement and"  
President Abb!s, under Saudi supervision, but that am!s was still surprised by the latest""  
decisions. This, he claims, indicate that the President responded to foreign pressure. 
The Minister of Local Government, Mu ammad al-Bargh"th# ( am!s), in the second part of! "  
the text (line 34-41) says that he was surprised by the President's decrees and that they will  
complicate the issue of reaching an agreement and have a negative effect. 
The last part of the text (line 42-97) is devoted to statements from the spokesperson of the  
Change and Reform block (5}pE8 WttCDE =[Cv), which represents am!s in the Legislative"  
Council, al!  al-Bardaw#l. He describes the decrees as being ' ! erratic (=RwSCf), contradicting 
(=¦\bBCf) and emotional (=tDbAdE), and stresses that these decrees do not have any connection to  
the constitution or the public good. In the end he says that it is necessary for the real leaders of  
the Fata  and am!  movements to meet and reshape the security apparatus to give it a! " &  
national shaping, and to put the the interests of the Palestinian people over the the interests of  
the factional groups. He also expresses his support to the unity government, the interior  
ministry and the joint forces.
3.3.2.1 Transitivity and transformations
Like in al- ay!t al-jad"da! , the different aspects of the conflict are in Filas "n"  presented as 
actions which are under the control of specific agents. A major difference, however, is that in  
Filas "n"  it is the am!s takeover which is given precedence in the coverage and not the"  
decisions taken by the President: 
(133)   FMN /bR\ U[Z qC¦w\ xIe ,b_HDE
(F-1, headline)
Al-Qass!m strengthens its grip on the Gaza Strip
(134) cKWRta QRabg FMN OP =tBfmE )EWHTE .Wg{ U[Z f{ (2biV) =tf}aE =f8bHTE =vWV G[KbHf WRta 
 /bRHDE =Pbv U[Z .OBtR_[ADE =tBfmE FMcomE F"b\8 "EWP{ %8W8 ,}_CaE lgOsb\GDE ]fmE )EWHf Iwp{8  
  .2biV O[KbHf <le¯g FMN /bR\ )bPbIf OP OB~GDE ]fmE8 =absWDE ]f{8 )EWgbSTE8 OBtR_[ADE2
(F-1, line 1-5)
Fighters from the Islamic Residence Movement ( am!s) yesterday took control over most"  
of the security headquarters in Gaza, extending its control to the entire Strip,  after the 
surrender and flight of the members and leaders of the Palestinian security apparatus. And 
the headquarters of the Palestinian Preventive Security, the Intelligence, the Presidential  
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Guards and the National Security in the governorates of the Gaza Strip came under the  
control of am!s fighters."
(135) OP hCAD =gbCDE =tBf^E *bHTE U[Z DGCaE 0E lg FMN /bR\ U[Z bcKWRta tiE 2biV R_g l\8 
./bRHDE2
(F-2, line 15-16)
am!s extended its control in the Gaza Strip on Thursday after it seized the headquarters"  
of the security belonging to Fata  in the (Gaza) Strip.!
The al-Qass!m Brigades are presented as the agent that strengthens its grip (qC¦w\ xIe) in 
(133). By choosing to use this specific verb, the newspaper indicates that the al-Qass!m  
Brigades had already been in control over the Gaza Strip for some time, and that the latest  
development does not represent a dramatic change. The same is the case in (135) in which  
am!s is the agent that " extended its control ( […] bcKWRta R_g). In (134), fighters from the  
Islamic Resistance Movement (=tf}aE =f8bHTE =vWV G[KbHf) are the agents who actively took  
control ( […] U[Z WRta), but also in this example is it indicated that this was more an expansion  
of its power by the inclusion of the nominalisation extending their control (cKWRta QRabg). As 
a further modifying aspect is the circumstances after the surrender and flight of the members  
and leaders of the Palestinian security apparatus 
(OBtR_[ADE =tBfmE FMcomE F"b\8 "EWP{ %8W8 ,}_CaE lg) also included, giving the impression that the  
am!s fighters moved in to fill a gap left by the Fata -controlled security apparatus. " !
Filas "n"  also refers to the decisions made by the President in its coverage on the front page,  
citing mainly the same statements that al- ay!t al-jad"da!  did in its coverage:
(136)  =Db\| *W\ 2bwZ "GiIf tsWDE 0E fE !b_f =tBtR_[ADE =absW[D ,bDE Qf^E tVWDE lwZ `tRDE ][Z{ 
.FMN /bR\ OP FWtu^E =tBf^E )E*GRCDE WE °*EGRDE =DbV #WP8 =tB tZbiaE  =absWg =tDbE =fGxE2  
(F-2, line 1-3)
The  Palestinian  Presidential  General  Secretary,  al- ayyib  Abd  al-Ra #m,  declared+ !"  
yesterday  evening  that  President  Ma m"d  Abb!s  decided  to  dismiss  the  the  current! "  
government headed by Ism! #l Haniyya and imposed state of emergency after the latest"  
security developments in the Gaza Strip.
(137)  =R[_DE OnE*E tio OP °*EGRDE =DbV" qtP ][ZE btdb bfGaWf *lpE 2bwZ 0E tVWDE lwZ 7bnE8 
 =tBtR_[ADE =tB~GDE2
(F-2, line 6-7)
And Abd al-Ra #m added that Abb!s issued a second decree in which he announced “a!" "  
state of emergency in all the territories of the Palestinian National Authority 
In both (136) and (137), the President is presented as the responsible agent who decided to  
dismiss (=Db\| *W\), imposed (#WP), issued (*lpE) and announced (][ZE). These choices in 
transitivity can serve to give an impression of the President as a responsible and powerful  
leader as it did in al- ay!t al-jad"da! , but Filas "n " modifies this impression by including  
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statements from am!s in which he is accused of not making these decisions on his own, and"  
that they were taken due to external pressure: 
(138) .=to*bu +G¦D %bjCaE tsWDE<  […]
(F-3, line 21-22) 
[…] the President responded to external pressure.
(139) ."=to*bu 'G¦D ¦u tsWDE%  [...]
(F-3, line 33)
“[...] the President succumbed to external pressure”.
In the same statements, am!s is on its part presented as being active in the work to reach a"  
peaceful solution to the conflict:
(140) [...] F*"bwf =vWE fl\ f{ (8{” 2 "
(F-3, line 23-24)
“The movement presented an initiative the day before yesterday [...]”
(141) =vWCYTE FGHDE tZlK f8 =t[tuElDE F*E.8 tZlK f8 =tB~GDE FlVGDE =fGxV tZlK f ]Id8
(F-3, line 94-96)
We are for strengthening the national unity government, the interior ministry and the joint  
force 
The am!s movement is in these examples the active agent which " presented (fl\) an 
initiative in (140) and which declare its apparent support for the institutions contained in the  
Mecca agreement in (141). 
3.3.2.2 Lexicon
As mentioned, the main focus of Filas "n" 's coverage is on the am!s takeover of the security"  
headquarters. The lexical choices in the newspaper's own reports covering this aspect affirm  
the impression created by the choices in transitivity, namely that this took form more of a  
consolidation of am!s' existing power than of a dramatic change: "
(142)   qC¦w\ xIe (F-1, headline) 'strengthens its grip'
(143)   cKWRta QRabg (F-1, line 2) 'extending their control'
(144)   bc~WRta tiE 2biV R_g (F-2, line 15) ' am!s on Thursday extended its control'"
(145)   %8W8 ,}_CaE lg (F1, line 2-3) 'after the surrender and flight'
Filas "n " in its coverage also includes the statements made by the Presidential General 
Secretary Abd al-Ra #m concerning the decisions taken by the President. Since these!"  
statements are the same which were referred to in al- ay!t al-jad"da! , the same vocabulary 
denoting am!s' actions as violations is present: "
(146)   =tfEWo^E %WE (F-2: line 7) 'the criminal war'
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(147)   <Wx_DE %}Hd^E (F-2: line 8) 'the military coup'
(148)   h[_TE 0btJDE (F-2: line 8) 'the armed revolt'
(149)   =tBtR_[ADE =tZWYDE ln =eWx_Z =tg}HdE =D8bIf (F-2: line 17-18) 'attempted military coup  
against the Palestinian legislation'
(150)   Oaba^E 0GdbH[D hnE8 $bcCdE (F-2: line 18) 'clear violation against the Basic Law'
The am!s spokesperson Ab" Zahr# on his part has a different approach in his statement,"  
which is identical to example (130) from Text E:
(151)  !}iDE 0bR\" ] f /bRH[D "0b  WeW²”8 " (F-1: line 6-7) 'second liberation of the (Gaza)  
Strip from herds of agents'
This is the only example in Filas "n" 's report in which am!s uses a vocabulary seemingly"  
aimed at justifying its own actions. Instead, considerable space is given to statements which  
focus on the President's decisions, and which contains a lexicon that presents them as being far  
from legitimate: 
(152)   =nGPWf/#GPWf (F-3: headline, line 5 and 9) 'unacceptable'
(153)   bcD =t[iZ =it\ ^ (F-3: headline) 'they have no practical value'
(154)   =t[iZ =it\ Ud"E qD tD (F-3: line 6) 'it has not the least practical value'
(155)   =RwSCf (F-3: line 42, 47 and 83) 'erratic'
(156)   =¦\bBCf (F-3: line 48) 'contradicting'
(157)   =tDbAdE (F-3: line 48 and 82) 'emotional' 
(158)   *GCalDbg bcD =\}Z ^ (F-3: line 49 and 83) 'they have no connection to the constitution'
Despite the latest development and the apparent unavoidable break between the two parties,  
am!s is, in statements made by its parliamentary group, also linked to a vocabulary which"  
focuses on unity and collaboration:
(159)   =tB~8 =Nbtp (F-3: line 91) 'national shape'
(160)   OBtR_[ADE `Y[D bt[DE =I[JTE (F-3: line 92-93) 'the best interest of the Palestinian  
people'
(161)   =tB~GDE FlVGDE =fGxV tZlK (F-3: line 94) 'support the national unity government'     
(162)   =vWCYTE FGHDE tZlK (F-3: line 95-96) 'support the joint force'   
8"8"8%9:33('/%21%.;5%72-5'(<5%21%.;5%*5+M:'5%21%.;5%*57:'+./%;5(0N:('.5'*%+)%O(M( %
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Following the intensification of the conflict between Fata  and am!s on 11 June 2007, we! "  
witnessed a change in the coverage of the two newspapers from a relatively conform  
representation situated within what I chose to call a national unity discourse, to a diversified  
representation in which their respective political affiliations were displayed more clearly than  
in the coverage of the mid-May fighting. While Filas "n " entered into a more conflict-oriented 
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discourse, al- ay!t al-jad"da ! remained cautious in its reports on the violence not to blame 
specific groups, and as such stayed closer to the national unity discourse. After the events of  
14 June 2007, however, which led to am!s taking over the security headquarters in Gaza and"  
President Abb!s dissolving the government and declaring a state of emergency, it is apparent"  
that the national unity discourse has been abandoned by both papers. Despite covering the  
same events in their reports, we find clear differences in the respective representations of these  
events, which are seemingly aimed at legitimising the actions of one or the other party in the  
conflict in line with each paper's political affiliations. 
The diversification in representation is not only displayed in different choices in transitivity  
and lexicon, but also in which aspects of the events that are focused upon in the two papers.  
Al- ay!t al-jad"da! 's main focus is on the decisions taken by the President as a reaction to the  
am!s takeover. These decisions are in the text presented as actions which are undertaken by"  
President Abb!s as the sole agent, creating an impression of a strong leader who has the"  
power and will to act when needed. Since he was appointed Prime Minister for the first time in  
2000, Abb!s has been accused by different elements in the Palestinian society of being a"  
weak leader and of being a puppet of Israel and the West (cf. 1.1). Faced with the challenge  
from am!s and Prime Minister Haniyya, it is therefore seemingly important for Fata  to" !  
negate this image and to build consensus for him as a legitimate leader of the Palestinian  
people, and al- ay!t al-jad"da ! contributes to this by making his decisions the main focus of 
its coverage. 
The focus on the President's reaction to the latest developments also moves the attention to a  
certain extent away from the seizure of the security headquarters in the Gaza Strip by am!s"  
and its affiliated groups, which represented a devastating blow to Fata 's authority in the area.!  
This aspect could not be ignored in the report, however, and while al- ay!t al-jad"da!  
previously has used transformations to conceal responsibility for violent aspects of the  
conflict, it here presents these events as actions under the control of am!s. Fata  fighters on" !  
their part are at the same time mentioned as only being affected participants in this part of the  
report, with some indications that am!s fighters committed violations against them (cf."  
(123)). This representation contributes to creating an impression of am!s as the aggressive"  
part responsible for the dramatic situation that has occurred, and at the same time it legitimises  
the decisions taken by President Abb!s by portraying them as a necessary reaction to this"  
aggression.
Filas "n"  on its part chooses to put main focus on the seizure of the security headquarters in its  
coverage. In contrast to the representation in al- ay!t al-jad"da! , however, it presents this 
aspect of the events not as a dramatic change in the situation which might have negative  
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consequences, but rather as a natural consolidation of am!s' power in the Gaza Strip. The"  
active role of the movement is also toned down as Filas "n" , instead of including statements 
from witnesses saying that am!s fighters evicted members of the security apparatus, states"  
that the latter voluntarily surrendered and fled (cf. (134)), leaving it open for am!s to move"  
in and take control. Fata  is thereby given its share of responsibility for the developments. As!  
a consequence of this, the decisions taken by President Abb!s are in " Filas "n " not presented as 
a strong and necessary reaction to actions undertaken by am!s. Instead, statements from"  
am!s in which is claimed that these decisions came as a consequence of external pressure"  
are included, something which challenges not only their validity, but also the legitimacy of the  
President.  
The lexical choices in the texts also support the impression that the two newspapers contribute  
to building consensus in line with their political affiliations, and interestingly this is mainly  
done by including a vocabulary that links the opposite part to negative, delegitimising values.  
In its coverage of the 11 June 2007 fighting, al- ay!t al-jad"da ! did not include any statements 
with a vocabulary that linked any specific groups to negative, delegitimising values. This time,  
however, the statements by the Presidential General Secretary Abd al-Ra #m, which are given!"  
considerable space in its report, denotes the actions undertaken by am!s by using a lexicon"  
which links the movement to such values: 
Lexicon Values
=tdEWo^E %WE 'the criminal war' (124) Illegality, violence
<Wx_DE %}Hd^E 'the military coup' (125) Illegality, chaos
h[_TE 0btJDE 'the armed revolt' (126) Violence, chaos, illegality
Oaba^E 0GdbH[D hnE8 $bcCdE 'clear violation of 
the Basic Law' (128)
Illegality
The aim of Abd al-Ra #m is here apparently to undermine the authority of am!s by linking! ""  
it to illegality, chaos and violence. By indicating that the movement took control of the Gaza 
Strip through an illegal and violent military coup he not only delegitimises the rule of Prime  
Minister Haniyya, but also gives legitimacy to President Abb!s and his decision to dissolve"  
the current government and form a new government under Fata  leadership. The statements!  
by the Presidential General Secretary are also included in Filas "n" 's report, and the linkage of 
am!s to negative, delegitimising values are thus present also in this newspaper. The"  
impression of am!s' actions as illegal and violent are, however, modified by the lexicon used"  
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in Filas "n" 's  own report on the events which describes it as an undramatic consolidation of  
power (cf. examples (143)-(145)). 
In addition, Filas "n" 's report also includes several statements by am!s and its affiliated"  
groups concerning the decisions made by the President, in which these decisions are depicted  
by a lexicon that presents them as illegitimate and that links the President to negative,  
delegitimising values: 
Lexicon Values
=RwSCf 'erratic' (155) Weakness, chaos
=¦\bBCf 'contradicting' (156) Chaos, weakness
=tDbAdE 'emotional' (157) Weakness, irresponsibility
*GCalDbg bcD =\}Z ^ 'they have no connection 
to the constitution' (158)
Illegality, corruption
The representation of President Abb!s as a strong leader is here challenged by am!s as he is""  
linked to weakness, chaos and irresponsibility. As already mentioned, it has been common for 
his opponents to portray him as weak and as being under the control of foreign powers. The  
statements by am!s support this image, which clearly undermines his authority and"  
subsequently the authority of Fata  and the new government. At the same time, the actions!  
undertaken by am!s in the Gaza Strip can be seen as a necessary response to the weakness"  
and irresponsibility of the President, and this representation therefore also indirectly gives  
legitimacy to the authority of am!s and Prime Minister Haniyya.  "
Interestingly, Filas "n"  in its report also includes statements by the parliamentary group of  
am!s, the Change and Reform Block, which includes a vocabulary that refers to national"  
unity and joint efforts, linking the movement to positive, legitimising values:
Lexicon Values
OBtR_[ADE `Y[D bt[DE =I[JTE 'the best 
interest of the Palestinian people' (160)
Responsibility, honesty
=tB~GDE FlVGDE =fGxV tZlK 'support the 
national unity government' (161)
Responsibility, peacefulness, order
=vWCYTE FGHDE tZlK 'support the joint force'  
(162)
Responsibility, peacefulness, order
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Through these statements, am!s apparently aims at contradicting the impression that it is"  
responsible for the crisis in the national unity project by insisting that it stills support the  
national unity government and the joint force, and that it represents responsibility, 
peacefulness and order. The inclusion of these statements, however, does not change the  
impression that the most important aspect in the two papers' representations is to build  
consensus for the respective parties according to their political affiliations.  
4. Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to show how ideological meaning is expressed in seemingly  
neutral newspaper reports on three significant events in the intra-Palestinian power struggle  
between Fata  and am!s in May and June 2007. Based on the theoretical and! "  
methodological framework of discourse analysis, following especially the analytical  
framework developed by Norman Fairclough under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis,  
I have analysed and compared the main stories from the Fata -affiliated newspaper ! al- ay!t!  
al-jad"da and the am!s-affiliated newspaper " Filas "n"  covering these three events. According 
to Fairclough (cf. 2.5), a combination of textual and social analysis is necessary in order to get  
the full picture of communicative events such as newspaper reports, and in the first part of the  
thesis I therefore give an overview of the historical and sociocultural context in which the two  
newspapers operate, before moving on to the textual analysis which make up the main part of  
the thesis. 
In the analysis, I have chosen to examine especially the choices of the two newspapers  
concerning the linguistic features of transitivity and lexicon, which according to Roger Fowler  
(cf. 2.5) are particularly inclined to carry ideological meaning in a text. My findings support  
this view. Different choices regarding transitivity have a major impact on how the two papers  
represent different aspects of the events, and by referring to the wider political and  
sociocultural context surrounding the reports, I found that these representations clearly reflect  
the political affiliations of the two newspapers. The interests of the respective parties are  
conveyed in the way in which the two papers present certain aspects of the events as processes  
which are neither deliberate nor controlled, and other aspects as actions which are under the  
control of specified agents. As these interests change according to developments in the  
political and social conditions, the choices concerning transitivity in the reports also change,  
resulting in a move from a relatively conform representation in the coverage of the mid-May  
fighting to more diversified and conflict-orientated representations of the two other events.  
The reports of the mid-May fighting are situated within what I have called a national unity  
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discourse. Both papers use transformations such as passives and nominalisations in order to  
conceal responsibility for violence in their reports on these events, while positive efforts to  
resolve the conflict are presented as actions under the control of both parties and the  
government. In this way, the representations are in line with the interests of both Fata  and!  
am!s to communicate the message that the unity government and the Mecca agreement were"  
still strong. 
As the conflict intensifies on the ground, however, the choices in transitivity change and lead  
to more conflict-oriented representations which are seemingly aimed at building consensus for  
one or the other party, in accordance with the respective political affiliations of the two  
newspapers. The papers build consensus for “their” party both by presenting it as the sole  
agent behind positive efforts to resolve the conflict, and by presenting violent aspects of the  
conflict as actions under the control of the other party. In the reports on the fighting on 11  
June, al- ay!t al-jad"da ! follows mainly the former strategy by focusing on Fata 's active role!  
in the efforts undertaken to end the conflict, while Filas "n"  on its part focuses on Fata  as the!  
agents responsible for violence. I claim that the strategy of Filas "n"  here is more conflict-
orientated than that of al- ay!t al-jad"da! , which apparently aims at staying more in line with 
the national unity discourse, reflecting the fact that Fata  at this point had a stronger interest in!  
upholding the impression that the unity project was still valid. In its report on the events of 14  
June 2007, which showed that the Mecca agreement would not survive and that a split was  
unavoidable, al- ay!t al-jad"da! , however, takes a further step away from the national unity  
discourse and also gives a more conflict-orientated representation clearly aimed at building  
consensus for Fata . !
In addition to choices regarding transitivity, the analysis shows that lexical choices also play  
an important role in conveying ideological meaning in the newspaper reports. In chapter 2.4, I  
listed a set of so-called consensus values which I expected that the lexical choices of the two  
newspapers would refer to in order to help build consensus for the respective parties in the  
conflict. The findings confirm this hypothesis as both papers use vocabulary in their reports  
that on one hand links the party affiliated to the respective party to positive delegitimising  
values, and on the other hand links the other party to negative, delegitimising values. 
The events of 14 June 2007 led to a split in the Palestinian territories that has remained in  
place until today. The findings of this study show that the two newspapers reflect the increased  
conflict-level that took place in May and June 2007 by engaging in a gradually more conflict-
orientated discourse in their representations, clearly displayed in the choices made regarding  
transitivity and lexicon. 
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